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Copyright’s Memory Hole
Eric Goldman,* Jessica Silbey**
There is growing interest in using copyright to protect the privacy and
reputation of people depicted in copyrighted works. This pressure is driven
by heightened concerns about privacy and reputation on the Internet, plus
copyright’s plaintiff-favorable attributes compared to traditional privacy
and reputation torts.
The Constitution authorizes copyright law because its exclusive rights
benefit society by increasing our knowledge. But copyright law is being
misdeployed by suppressing socially valuable works in a
counterproductive attempt to advance privacy and reputation interests.
This results in “memory holes” in society’s knowledge, analogous to those
discussed in George Orwell’s dystopian novel 1984.
This Article identifies some limited circumstances where copyright’s
goals are benefited by considering privacy and reputational interests. In
other circumstances, treating copyright law as a general-purpose privacy
and reputation tort harms us all.
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Copyright’s Memory Hole

INTRODUCTION
Copyright law encourages the production and dissemination of
socially valuable works by giving the creator (or a designee) some
control over the works’ dissemination. This control allows
copyright owners to establish and manage distribution channels for
their works and stop competitive free-riding on the creator’s
investments. When this paradigm works properly, society benefits
from the knowledge disseminated in copyrighted works, which
advances the constitutional goal of “promot[ing] the [p]rogress of
[s]cience.”1
It is an essential feature of copyright law that copyright owners
can suppress their works from the public. Indeed, there are many
circumstances where such suppression advances copyright’s goals.
For example, windowed releases (when the works temporarily
have limited or no distribution) can help copyright owners
maximize their overall economic returns,2 and the suppression of
unpublished works can spur their production and development.3
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. In eighteenth-century parlance, “science” in this context
means “knowledge.” See L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF
COPYRIGHT: A LAW OF USERS’ RIGHTS 48 (1991) (“[T]he word science retains its eighteenthcentury meaning of ‘knowledge or learning.’”); Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual
Property Clause: Promotion of Progress as a Limitation on Congress’s Intellectual Property Power,
94 GEO. L.J. 1771 (2006); Malla Pollack, Dealing with Old Father William, or Moving from
Constitutional Text to Constitutional Doctrine: Progress Clause Review of the Copyright Term
Extension Act, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 337, 376 (2002) (“‘Science’ means ‘knowledge’ in an
anachronistically broad sense.”); Ned Snow, The Meaning of Science in the Copyright Clause,
2013 BYU L. REV. 259 (2013); Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and
Useful Arts: The Background and Origin of the Intellectual Property Clause of the United States
Constitution, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 51 (1994) (“[I]n the latter part of the eighteenth century
‘science’ was synonymous with ‘knowledge’ and ‘learning.’”).
2. E.g., Matt Schruers, The Public Costs of Private Distribution Strategies: Content Release
Windows as Negative Externalities, DISRUPTIVE COMPETITION PROJECT (June 2, 2015),
http://www.project-disco.org/intellectual-property/060215-the-public-costs-of-privatedistribution-strategies-content-release-windows-as-negative-externalities.
3. See infra Part B. There are other reasons copyright owners may suppress the
publication of unpublished works, including for reasons related to relationship building or
preservation, and reasons unrelated to economic situations. Copyright law is not practically
limited to economic motives. See, e.g., JESSICA SILBEY, THE EUREKA MYTH: CREATORS,
INNOVATORS, AND EVERYDAY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 274–85 (2015) [hereinafter SILBEY,
EUREKA MYTH] (summarizing empirical findings from within various creative and
innovative communities that demonstrate multiple bases for asserting copyright claims
beyond utilitarian and economic reasons); Jeanne C. Fromer, Should the Law Care Why
Intellectual Property Rights Have Been Asserted?, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 549, 557–58 (2015). Further,
we understand that “promot[ing] the Progress of Science” is a broad and evolving mandate
that includes generating copyrighted works and increasing knowledge and understanding
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The Internet’s popularity has accelerated interest in a
qualitatively different type of suppression, where copyright
owners target works for suppression based on privacy or
reputational concerns. Sometimes, the continued online publication
of works causes severe and life-changing consequences. For
example, people may support legal recourse—including copyright
law—for nonconsensual pornography victims to stop further
publication.4 Copyright’s doctrinal features make it a potent legal
tool to redress these and other sympathetic situations. As a result,
it can be tempting to turn copyright law into an all-purpose tool for
suppressing content online.
Unfortunately, when deployed as a general-purpose tort,
copyright law also can cause over-suppression.5 People concerned
about their privacy or reputation can “weaponize” copyright law
to suppress works that they personally object to but that otherwise
benefit society’s knowledge base.6 Unlike other laws custom-built
for those purposes, copyright law was not designed to be a generalpurpose privacy- or reputation-enhancing law. As a result,
copyright law lacks the doctrinal features necessary to
accommodate privacy and reputational considerations and still
yield the expected social benefits from copyrighted works.7
Copyright over-suppression brings to mind the fictional
Ministry of Truth’s “memory hole” in George Orwell’s dystopian
through creative expression in a variety of ways. See Jessica Silbey, Promoting Progress: A
Qualitative Analysis of Creative and Innovative Production, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 515, 517–18 (Matthew David & Debora Halbert eds., 2014) (quoting
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8) (citing scholarship on the meaning of “progress”).
4. E.g., Derek E. Bambauer, Exposed, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2025 (2014); Margaret Chon,
Copyright’s Other Functions, 15 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 364 (2016); Andrew Gilden, Sex,
Death, and Intellectual Property, 32 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 67 (2018). But see Rebecca Tushnet, How
Many Wrongs Make a Copyright?, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2346 (2014) (responding to Bambauer).
5. Honorable M. Margaret McKeown, Censorship in the Guise of Authorship:
Harmonizing Copyright and the First Amendment, 15 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 1, 16 (2016)
(“[C]opyright could have a censorial effect on specific instances of offensive speech or
unpleasant facts.” (citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,
559 (1985))).
6. Cf. Fox News Network, LLC v. TVEyes, Inc., 883 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2018) (Fox News
restricted a third party news aggregator database to prevent its clips from being used to
criticize the network); Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding
that an author’s control over unpublished letters supersedes third parties’ rights to publish
extracts under fair use).
7. Wendy J. Gordon, Copyright Owners’ Putative Interests in Privacy, Reputation, and
Control: A Reply to Goold, 103 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 36, 45–46 (2017); Tushnet, supra note 4.
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novel 1984, which permanently erased documents containing
embarrassing or inconvenient accounts of the past. Copyright can
create the legal analogue of a memory hole. Copyright’s memory
holes may not be motivated by authoritarianism, but the
consequences for society are no less perilous. The resulting
depletion of knowledge paradoxically conflicts with the
Constitutional justification of copyright law to promote the
progress of knowledge. This Article explores that paradox.
This Article proceeds as follows. The first Part briefly explains
the memory hole analogy. The second Part describes the legal
landscape regarding privacy and reputation management online
and why copyright law has emerged as a popular choice for
privacy- and reputation-management. The third Part provides a
taxonomy, with several case studies, of how copyright owners try
to create memory holes and explains why these efforts are
pernicious. The fourth Part explores when privacy considerations
might complement or conflict with copyright’s goals. The fifth and
final Part suggests some reform proposals to restrict misuse of
copyright’s memory hole.
I. THE MEMORY HOLE ANALOGY
George Orwell’s novel 1984 described a censorious government
that restricts all efforts at free speech. One of the government’s
speech-control tools was the memory hole:
In the walls of the cubicle there were three orifices. To the right of
the speakwrite, a small pneumatic tube for written messages, to
the left, a larger one for newspapers; and in the side wall, within
easy reach of Winston’s arm, a large oblong slit protected by a
wire grating. This last was for the disposal of waste paper. Similar
slits existed in thousands or tens of thousands throughout the
building, not only in every room but at short intervals in every
corridor. For some reason they were nicknamed memory holes.
When one knew that any document was due for destruction, or
even when one saw a scrap of waste paper lying about, it was an
automatic action to lift the flap of the nearest memory hole and
drop it in, whereupon it would be whirled away on a current of
warm air to the enormous furnaces which were hidden
somewhere in the recesses of the building.8

8. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 34–35 (Penguin Books 1954) (1949).
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The memory holes in 1984 are designed to remove ideas,
facts, and expressions from human society, which creates gaps
in society’s information and knowledge. The information in
the destroyed papers may linger in human minds, only to be
forgotten eventually.
A miscalibrated copyright law can cause similar consequences.
Copyright law may only protect the expression of ideas and facts,9
not the facts or ideas themselves, but controlling copyrightable
expression can be enough to effectively suppress the underlying
ideas and facts being expressed. Thus, copyright law can hinder
and potentially reverse truth-seeking processes, expressive
diversity, and the progress of science that copyright law aims to
promote. In the worst-case outcomes, memory holes can facilitate
the rewriting of history10 and undermine resistance to authority
figures who may not be acting in the community’s best interests.11
Admittedly, the memory hole analogy is imperfect. 1984
addressed government censorship, while this Article addresses
private actors who seek to protect their privacy or reputation. We
expect (sometimes over-optimistically) that the government tries to
benefit its constituents, which makes censorship—especially one
designed to support or protect the government’s power and
authority—an unconscionable affront to the public welfare. In
contrast, copyright law by design assumes that copyright owners
will maximize their private welfare, so it is not surprising or
inherently anti-social when copyright owners do that (even if by
suppressing speech). Still, the memory hole analogy highlights how
the control or censorship of facts and ideas (and the expressive
works that communicate them) can hurt society, whether it is done
by the government or private citizens.
Also, the Ministry of Truth’s memory hole effectively erases all
traces of the suppressed material. The system targeted not only the
pieces of paper but also the facts and ideas they contain for the
memory hole. In contrast, copyright cannot suppress facts or ideas,
so facts and ideas from a suppressed work can be extracted pre9. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2018).
10. See, e.g., ORWELL, supra note 8, at ch. 4 (“The past was alterable. The past never
had been altered. Oceania was at war with Eastasia. Oceania had always been at war
with Eastasia.”).
11. See, e.g., id. at 39–40 (“Who controls the past controls the future. Who controls the
present controls the past.”).
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suppression and then freely disseminated in other works without
further intervention from copyright. Thus, copyright’s memory
hole is less thorough and effective than the Ministry of Truth’s.
Nevertheless, suppressing copyrighted works can relegate the
facts and ideas which those works contain to persisting only in
people’s memories.12 With the works suppressed, those facts and
ideas can fade out of circulation—and eventually fade away
altogether.13 Alternatively, when copyright law suppresses the
source of facts or ideas, it can remove the most credible evidence to
validate or contest those facts and ideas, creating opportunities to
undermine the search for truth in the first place.14
Thus, despite its limits, the memory hole analogy has some
explanatory value. Imagine the relevant universe of known content
as a large fabric sheet. Successful litigation based on suppressing
copyrighted content tears little pieces of fabric out of the sheet—
leaving holes where the knowledge used to be. These holes
represent gaps in our knowledge caused by copyright. Should the
holes become too numerous or too large, they threaten the integrity
of the entire sheet.
In other words, when copyright owners suppress published
content for their private benefit, their actions in the aggregate can
negatively affect us all. Orwell’s memory holes served
totalitarianism fueled by ignorance. Copyright’s memory holes
may not advance totalitarianism, but the consequences may be
dystopian nevertheless. By facilitating the selective suppression of
12. Cf. Fromer, supra note 3 (discussing how recluse tycoon Howard Hughes tried to
control literary material about him by acquiring exclusive rights to the stories).
13. See id. at 571 (“When rightsholders want to protect their privacy or reputation, they
frequently care less about keeping protected expression out of the public eye and more about
keeping private unprotected facts or ideas.”); cf. RAY BRADBURY, FAHRENHEIT 451 (1953)
(involving efforts to keep the memories of burned books alive through oral transmission).
Admittedly, sometimes a person may want their memories to fade, but they should not be
able to force other people’s memories to fade or be forgotten entirely. For further discussion
of this point, see infra Part 3, discussing “nostalgic remembrances.”
14. Of course, not all copyrighted works clarify facts and ideas; works can mislead
and distort as well. However, First Amendment doctrine, which copyright law incorporates,
tends to favor more speech to clarify and correct false or misleading speech instead of its
censorship or erasure. This is known as the “counterspeech doctrine,” and while not always
an optimal solution, especially when time is of the essence, it is deeply rooted in
constitutional law. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(“If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the
evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not
enforced silence.”).

935

002.GOLDMAN_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

7/17/20 12:37 PM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2019

information for private benefit, copyright can shape how society
thinks—one of the key preconditions for 1984’s dystopia. The
copyright memory hole analogy helpfully highlights these stakes.
II. WHY COPYRIGHT IS USED TO CREATE MEMORY HOLES
In the digital age, people seek—sometimes desperately—legal
recourse to suppress undesirable information about them. Where
some United States law makes such efforts difficult, including the
First Amendment and speech-enhancing statutes like Section
230, copyright law has emerged as a tool of choice to create
memory holes.
A. Reputation vs. Privacy
This Article discusses people’s privacy and reputation
considerations, sometimes freely switching between the two
concepts despite their different objects of concern. However, for
this Article’s purpose, privacy and reputation law share the same
motivations and consequences of their deployment.
People routinely deploy both privacy- and reputationmanagement laws to control how other people think about them.15
This similarity is especially apparent when a person’s image is
widely used and copied to expose the private information it
depicts, such as a politician engaging in a scandalous but private
sexual affair. In these circumstances, privacy and reputation laws
both serve the same purpose of controlling the image’s display.
Moreover, the Internet’s critical role in our modern society
compounds the overlap between privacy and public reputation.
The Internet increasingly dominates our information flows. The
Internet’s potential global visibility raises the stakes on reputation
formation and management and correspondingly shrinks the zones
of personal privacy. A person’s reputation can be instantly—and
sometimes permanently—defined by a single, “private,” and minor
incident that is publicized on the Internet.16 Affected individuals
15. There are surely circumstances where a person or company may be interested in
privacy for reasons that have nothing to do with reputation, as we discuss infra in Part B,
where we critique copyright law as a suppression tool.
16. For example, a South Korean woman who failed to clean up her dog’s excrement
gained worldwide recognition as the “Dog Poop Girl” after a video of her inaction went
viral. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON
THE INTERNET 2 (2007). In another example, public relations professional Justine
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scramble to find legal tools to successfully reestablish control over
their public identity. Both privacy and reputation laws can serve as
those tools.
The legal protections for privacy (especially common law
privacy torts17) and for reputation (especially defamation) share
common doctrinal features. They both govern the dissemination of
information, have similar remedies, and are subject to significant
First Amendment limits. Indeed, they are often lumped together in
legal taxonomies and fields of study.18
To the extent there is a difference between reputation and
privacy, this Article focuses on the copyright/privacy interface—
that is, efforts to treat copyright law like privacy law. Copyright
law has other provisions that bear directly or indirectly on
professional and authorial reputation, such as moral rights that
allow visual artists to control their reputation when connected with
a work of art;19 protections for copyright notices;20 and protections
for copyright management information21 that help an author
associate a work with his or her name. The interfaces between these
specific statutory provisions and other tort-based reputation
protection laws are beyond this Article’s scope.22
Sacco’s reputation was globally defined by a twelve-word tweet. Jon Ronson, How One
Stupid Tweet Blew Up Justine Sacco’s Life, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Feb. 12, 2015), https://
www.nytimes.com/2015/02/15/magazine/how-one-stupid-tweet-ruined-justine-saccoslife.html; Ali Vingiano, This Is How a Woman’s Offensive Tweet Became the World’s Top Story,
BUZZFEED NEWS (Dec. 21, 2013, 8:36 PM), https://www.buzzfeed.com/alisonvingiano/thisis-how-a-womans-offensive-tweet-became-the-worlds-top-s.
17. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960).
18. For example, the American Law Institute has a restatement project for
“Defamation and Privacy.” Four Restatement Projects Launch, AM. L. INST. (Jan. 28, 2019),
https://www.ali.org/news/articles/four-restatement-projects-launch/. The professional
association for law professors (AALS) has a similar special interest section. See Section on
Defamation & Privacy, ASS’N AM. L. SCHOOLS, https://www.aals.org/sections/list/
defamation-and-privacy/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2019). See generally 2 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW
OF DEFAMATION § 10:10 (2019) (discussing difficulties distinguishing defamation from false
light privacy).
19. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2018).
20. Id. § 506(c)–(d).
21. Id. § 1202.
22. The effectiveness of the U.S. moral rights regime has been broadly debated and
comes under attack from both sides (for weaker or stronger moral rights). Compare with Amy
M. Adler, Against Moral Rights, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 263 (2009), with Justin Hughes,
American Moral Rights and Fixing the Dastar “Gap,” 2007 UTAH L. REV. 659. The First
Amendment limits the reach of a moral rights regime in the United States, in contrast to
Europe. See, e.g., Peter K. Yu, Moral Rights 2.0, in LANDMARK INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CASES
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B. Copyright’s Quid Pro Quo
The U.S. Constitution contemplates a quid pro quo to justify
copyright protection of expressive works in order to promote the
progress of science. Authors can receive “the exclusive [r]ight to
their respective [w]ritings”23 in exchange for society receiving the
benefit of those works circulating in society under various market
conditions. This quid pro quo improves society if the circulating
works contribute to the diffusion of cultural production and the
accumulation of knowledge.
Superficially, it may seem counterintuitive that copyright can
enhance society’s knowledge by restricting the flow of copyrighted
works. However, some types of dissemination restrictions can
increase incentives to create the works. For example, controlling or
superseding older works may improve readership of and financial
returns from a subsequent work.24 The student textbook market
partially relies upon this.25 Also, a copyright owner might
experiment with multiple genres of works, and then decide to
suppress some genres to cultivate or maintain a reputation in other
genres with more commercial potential. Or, a copyright owner may
temporally stagger releases of a work (“windowing”)26 to price
discriminate against consumers willing to pay for early access. In
these and other circumstances, restricting the dissemination of
works can be consistent with the copyright’s utilitarian incentivebased rationale.
Of course, some copyright creators do not care about financial
payoffs or seek to maximize their returns on investment.27
Copyright owners assert their copyright interests for non-financial
AND THEIR LEGACY

13 (Christopher Heath & Anselm Kamperman Sanders eds., 2011). This
Article considers only U.S. law and does not address the complexities raised by foreign moral
rights schemes.
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
24. See, e.g., PolyGram Holding, Inc. (Three Tenors), 136 F.T.C. 310 (2003), aff’d, 416 F.3d
29 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (copyright owners sought to restrict sales of existing works because they
feared such sales would reduce demand for a newly released work); see also Eric Schlachter,
The Intellectual Property Renaissance in Cyberspace: Why Copyright Law Could Be Unimportant on
the Internet, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 15 (1997).
25. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-806, COLLEGE TEXTBOOKS:
ENHANCED OFFERINGS APPEAR TO DRIVE RECENT PRICE INCREASES (2005).
26. E.g., Schruers, supra note 2.
27. See SILBEY, EUREKA MYTH, supra note 3 (establishing this empirically across
creative fields).
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reasons as well.28 Copyright owners may do so by refusing to
license the works for new contexts or derivative purposes because
they want to control all versions of their work—for example,
sequels, abridgments or spin-offs.29 Copyright owners may also
decide to completely withdraw their work from the public sphere.
These alternative motivations can create friction for copyright
doctrines predicated on utilitarian justifications.30 However, they fit
more comfortably within other theories that justify copyright
protection, such as the Lockean/”natural rights” theory that people
should be rewarded for their labor31 or the Kantian “personhood”
theory that authors should control work that is an extension of their
personality. This Part focuses on copyright’s utilitarian
justification. Part IV relaxes that assumption.
When copyright is properly understood as an intermediary
benefit for authors and owners in exchange for society receiving
those works as a contribution to the “progress of science,” privacy
claims that suppress the work violate copyright’s quid pro quo.
Indeed, privileging privacy over dissemination reverses the
hierarchy of copyright’s beneficiaries, putting the author or
copyright owner above the social welfare of “progress” that the
Constitution’s Intellectual Property Clause contemplates as the
ultimate goal. As a creature of positive law, and not as a natural
right, copyright functions as an incentive to create and disseminate
expressive works. The incentive may be easily misunderstood as
creating a natural right to one’s expression equal to society’s
interests in accumulating knowledge, especially as copyright has
expanded over decades to be longer and stronger than in the past.32
But copyright’s quid pro quo does not work that way. Rights are
granted with the expectation that the expression protected will
contribute to the common weal.

28. See, e.g., id. at 218–25.
29. See Deidré A. Keller, Recognizing the Derivative Works Right as a Moral Right: A Case
Comparison and Proposal, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 511 (2012).
30. Fromer, supra note 3.
31. See Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism
in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1540–44 (1993).
32. Jessica Litman, Billowing White Goo, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 587 (2008) (explaining
how copyright’s exclusive rights have been expanding while fair use’s “footprint” has
remained static).
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C. Memory Holes Without Copyright
Because every Internet-posted work has the potential to reach a
global audience, people regularly seek legal tools that give them
control of content about them.
The European Union’s “right to be forgotten” (RTBF) is one
such tool. RTBF allows individuals to remove search engine links
to irrelevant, outdated, or otherwise objectionable information
about them, unless there is sufficient countervailing public
interest.33 For example, a person can request that Google remove
links to personal information about the person’s finances (such as a
bankruptcy) that was published in a newspaper.34 The original
newspaper publication is not erased—RTBF is not a comprehensive
memory hole—but the material is “obscured” by becoming harder
to find.35
RTBF is hugely popular. As of December 12, 2018, Google had
received over 750,000 removal requests covering nearly three
million URLs.36 And, the RTBF concept is expanding to jurisdictions
beyond Europe.37
In contrast to RTBF and other international content suppression
doctrines, United States law heavily restricts erasing or removing
content both constitutionally and statutorily. The First Amendment
prohibits state or federal governments from “abridging the
freedom of speech,”38 which significantly limits legally compelled
suppression for most types of speech. The First Amendment’s
speech and press freedoms further protect publishers’ editorial
33. Because the content remains on the original publisher’s site and only the search
engine links are removed, the “forgotten” reference is a misnomer. It might be more
accurately characterized as a right to make the content harder to find or to obscure the
content. See Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, Obscurity: A Better Way to Think About Your
Data Than ‘Privacy’, ATLANTIC (Jan. 17, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/
archive/2013/01/obscurity-a-better-way-to-think-about-your-data-than-privacy/267283/.
34. Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, 2014
E.C.R. 317.
35. Julie Cohen describes the possibility of producing obscurity through semantic
discontinuity. JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND THE
PLAY OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE 223–66 (2012).
36. Requests to Delist Content Under European Privacy Law, GOOGLE,
https://transparencyreport.google.com/eu-privacy/overview (last visited Nov. 7, 2019).
37. Farhad Manjoo, ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ Online Could Spread, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 5, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/06/technology/personaltech/right-tobe-forgotten-online-is-poised-to-spread.html.
38. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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discretion (what they choose to publish) by severely limiting prior
restraints of speech,39 such as pre-publication content suppression.
As a result, except with respect to a few specific classes of
unprotected speech (such as obscenity, child pornography,
incitements to imminent violence, etc.), most laws that restrict
dissemination on the basis of their content are subject to the highest
level of constitutional protection (“strict scrutiny”) and are
presumptively invalid.40
Legislatures have the authority to supplement the First
Amendment’s baseline protection with additional speechenhancing statutory provisions, and legislatures frequently do so.
For example, about 30 states41 have enacted “anti-SLAPP” laws—
”strategic lawsuits against public participation”—aimed at
prohibiting abusive lawsuits designed to suppress socially
beneficial speech.42 If a lawsuit qualifies as a SLAPP, the antiSLAPP law usually provides for procedural “fast lanes” to end the
lawsuit quickly and award attorneys’ fees to the defendant.43
Content suppression lawsuits may be considered SLAPPs.
Congress also enacted a significant free speech-enhancing
statute in 1996, codified at 47 U.S.C. § 230. Section 230 immunizes
online publishers for tort liability (including privacy and
reputational claims) attributable to content that originates from
third parties. Due to Section 230, online publishers cannot be
compelled to suppress third-party content—even if they receive
takedown notices or demand letters targeting the content,44 they

39. E.g., Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963); Near v. Minnesota ex
rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
40. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2224 (2015) (content-based restrictions
are subject to strict scrutiny); Near, 283 U.S. at 723 (previous restraints are
presumptively unconstitutional).
41. Anti-SLAPP Laws, PUB. PARTICIPATION PROJECT, https://anti-slapp.org/s/AntiSLAPP_State_Table-10_24_17.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2019).
42. GEORGE W. PRING & PENELOPE CANAN, SLAPPS: GETTING SUED FOR SPEAKING
OUT (1996).
43. Eric Goldman, 59 Legal Scholars Sign Letter Supporting SPEAK FREE Act to Create
Federal Anti-SLAPP Law, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Sept. 17, 2015), https://blog.
ericgoldman.org/archives/2015/09/59-legal-scholars-sign-letter-supporting-speak-freeact-to-create-federal-anti-slapp-law-forbes-cross-post.htm.
44. Zeranv. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
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“know” that the targeted content violates the law,45 and (perhaps
most surprisingly) a court orders the content’s removal.46
Because of Section 230’s powerful protections for free speech,
most legal demands for removal of online third-party content are
not successful. Most apropos to this Article, Section 230 means that
online publishers, virtually without exception, are not liable for
privacy violations or reputational injuries attributable to content
provided by third parties and are not obligated to remove content
in response to complaints or legal threats.47 This makes a Europeanstyle RTBF currently impossible in the United States; it would
conflict with both the First Amendment and Section 230.48
Section 230 has several statutory exceptions, including an
exclusion for intellectual property (discussed below). In the last few
years, plaintiffs have also found some common law gaps in Section
230’s immunity.49 However, for the most part, Section 230’s broad
immunity rule for online hosts and publishers remains a significant
enabler of Internet speech and a limitation on redressing privacy
and reputational concerns online.
Thus, the difficult-to-penetrate shield of the First Amendment,
supplemented by statutory protections, drives people seeking
content suppression to explore other legal options. This creates a
balloon-squeezing dynamic: as the primary legal tools that protect
privacy and reputation appear unavailable or weak, plaintiffs’
demand for legal redress gets pushed toward the edges of legal
options, such as copyright law.50

45. E.g., People v. Ferrer, No. 16FE019224, 2016 WL 7237305 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Dec. 9, 2016).
46. E.g., Giordano v. Romeo, 76 So. 3d 1100 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
47. ERIC GOLDMAN, INTERNET LAW: CASES & MATERIALS 346–49 (2018).
48. Id.
49. Eric Goldman, Ten Worst Section 230 Rulings of 2016 (Plus the Five Best), TECH. &
MARKETING L. BLOG (Jan. 4, 2017), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2017/01/tenworst-section-230-rulings-of-2016-plus-the-five-best.htm.
50. McKeown, supra note 5, at 1 (describing “the growing number of claims that
invoke copyright protection to remedy a broad array of personal harms—such as invasion
of privacy—and in the process tromp on the First Amendment”).
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D. Copyright’s Appeal as a Memory Hole
Copyright is an attractive tool for suppressing Internet content
and public discourse for five reasons.51
First, the First Amendment is already (nominally)
accommodated in the copyright statute. The Supreme Court has
said that copyright doctrine incorporates First Amendment
concerns through the idea/expression dichotomy, which says
copyright protects only expression of facts and ideas but not the
facts and ideas themselves, and the fair use doctrine, which excuses
secondary uses of copyrighted works to enable other specified
expressive activities deemed socially beneficial, such as education,
news reporting, and critique.52
Accordingly, there is no independent First Amendment defense
to a copyright infringement claim. If a copyright owner has a valid
copyright claim, the lawsuit does not conflict with First
Amendment doctrines. So when copyright owners use copyright
law to advance privacy or reputation concerns, they bypass the
typical First Amendment limits on privacy and reputation claims.53
Second, Section 230 contains a statutory exclusion for
“intellectual property” claims, including federal copyright claims.54
Section 230 does not protect online publishers from liability for
other people’s intellectual property infringement. Indeed,
copyright law is filled with cases where online services have been
held liable for, and gone out of business due to, user-directed

51. See id. at 11–16; see also John Tehranian, The New ©ensorship, 101 IOWA L. REV. 245,
262–66 (2015) (comparing copyright claims to right of publicity and trademark claims).
Professor Keller suggests another reason: that federal copyright law is uniform across the
country, rather than the state-by-state variations for the privacy and reputation torts. Deidré
A. Keller, Copyright to the Rescue: Should Copyright Protect Privacy?, 20 UCLA J.L. & TECH.
1 (2016).
52. Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302 (2012); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003); see
also 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2018) (ideas and concepts are not protected); id. § 107 (deeming uses
of works for the purposes of teaching, news reporting, comment, and criticism fair uses, and
reciting a four factor test).
53. See infra Part III; see also Keller, supra note 51.
54. In the Ninth Circuit, Section 230 may nevertheless immunize state copyright law
claims. Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2007); cf. Eric Goldman, The
Defend Trade Secrets Act Isn’t an “Intellectual Property” Law, 33 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.
541 (2017) (explaining the interaction between state IP laws and Section 230). Compare with
17 U.S.C. § 1401(g) (2018) (federal protection for pre-1972 sound recordings are excluded
from Section 230’s immunity). This minor exception is immaterial to our analysis.
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copyright infringements.55 By asserting a copyright claim, the
copyright owners avoid Section 230’s immunity.56
Third, in 1998, Congress enacted the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA). One of the DMCA’s provisions partially
backfills Section 230’s lack of immunity for online publishers from
liability for third party copyright infringements. The DMCA
provides a safe harbor for online publishers from liability for third
party content so long as the publishers expeditiously remove
allegedly infringing items upon the copyright owner’s request (a
provision frequently called “notice-and-takedown”).57 The
DMCA’s notice-and-takedown approach can help copyright
owners suppress allegedly infringing content simply by asking.58
Online publishers who receive a copyright takedown notice
have the legal right to forego the DMCA’s safe harbor by ignoring
the notice. Few online publishers choose this option. Without the
DMCA’s safe harbor protection, the publisher faces uncertain
liability and potentially ruinous financial outcomes.
Thus, the DMCA sets up carrot-and-stick incentives that push
online publishers towards over-suppression: removing content in
response to takedown notices preserves their eligibility for the safe
harbor, while ignoring takedown notices potentially leads to dire
consequences. The result has been a tsunami of copyright
takedown notices,59 many of which are not motivated by copyright

55. E.g., MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005); EMI Christian Music
Grp., Inc. v. MP3Tunes, LLC, 844 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2016); Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v.
Fung, 710 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2013); In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003);
Arista Records LLC v. Lime Grp. LLC, 715 F. Supp. 2d 481 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); cf. UMG
Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 667 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2011) (Veoh, a video
hosting site, was bankrupted by the lawsuit that confirmed its eligibility for the DMCA
safe harbor).
56. E.g., Bambauer, supra note 4, at 2055 (viewing Section 230’s limitation as a benefit
of expanding copyright liability).
57. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c), (d).
58. Jennifer M. Urban et al., Notice and Takedown: Online Service Provider and
Rightsholder Accounts of Everyday Practice, 64 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 371 (2017); Jennifer
M. Urban, et al., Takedown in Two Worlds: An Empirical Analysis, 64 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A.
483 (2017).
59. For example, Google alone has received requests to remove nearly four billion
URLs as of December 2018. Requests to Delist Content Due to Copyright, GOOGLE,
https://transparencyreport.google.com/copyright/overview (last visited Nov. 7, 2019).
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concerns.60 Unless the online publisher has some extra incentive to
defend the third party’s uploaded work, the DMCA takedown
notices typically lead to removal of the targeted work, even if the
publication is not copyright infringing.61
Fourth, copyright infringement is a strict liability offense.62
Plaintiffs do not have to show intent or knowledge of wrongdoing
on the part of the alleged infringer. Copyright plaintiffs avoid the
First Amendment scienter requirements for privacy and reputation
laws, such as the actual malice requirement for some defamation
claims.63 Without any scienter requirements, copyright claims are
easier, and may be cheaper, to win than analogous privacy or
reputation tort claims.64
Fifth, copyright law provides powerful remedies.65 In some
circumstances, copyright owners can obtain attorney’s fees and
statutory damages of up to $150,000 per work,66 irrespective of the
actual harm suffered by the copyright owner.67 Among other
benefits, the statutory damages do not have minimum scienter
prerequisites, unlike some defamation damages.68
60. Jennifer M. Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or “Chilling Effects”? Takedown
Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER
& HIGH TECH. L.J. 621 (2006).
61. E.g., Tehranian, supra note 51, at 273–76.
62. E.g., Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 308 (2d Cir. 1963);
Jacobs v. Memphis Convention & Visitors Bureau, 710 F. Supp. 2d 663, 678 (W.D. Tenn. 2010);
Faulkner v. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 576 F. Supp. 2d 609, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Gener-Villar v.
Adcom Grp., Inc, 509 F. Supp 2d 117, 124 (D.P.R. 2007) (“[T]he Copyright Act is a strict
liability regime under which any infringer, whether innocent or intentional, is liable.”); King
Records, Inc. v. Bennett, 438 F. Supp. 2d 812, 852 (M.D. Tenn. 2006); Educ. Testing Serv. v.
Simon, 95 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1087 (C.D. Cal. 1999); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line
Commc’n Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1370 (N.D. Cal. 1995). But see Patrick R. Goold, Is
Copyright Infringement a Strict Liability Tort?, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 305 (2015) (arguing that
copyright is a fault-based tort doctrine).
63. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (recovery for defamation of a
private figure requires actual malice when matter is a public concern); N.Y. Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (recovery for defamation of a public figure requires
actual malice).
64. Cf. Eric Goldman, Why Section 230 Is Better Than the First Amendment, NOTRE DAME
L. REV. ONLINE (forthcoming 2019) (discussing how Section 230’s statutory protection has
procedural and financial benefits over First Amendment litigation, even if the legal
conclusions were the same).
65. Keller, supra note 51.
66. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2018).
67. Id. § 505.
68. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348–50; Mike Steenson, Presumed Damages in Defamation Law, 40
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1492 (2014). Copyright statutory damages may be awarded in higher
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Copyright law also provides for equitable relief, including
injunctions against continued dissemination,69 which courts
routinely grant.70 Because copyright-based injunctions are not
subjected to First Amendment scrutiny, copyright may effectuate
“prior restraints” that would be nearly impossible when alleging
either a pure First Amendment claim or claims with explicit First
Amendment exemptions.71
Thus, copyright owners can obtain remedies that are not
available to plaintiffs asserting typical privacy or reputation law
claims—including, most crucially, injunctions that send content to
the memory hole. The framers of the Constitution and the Congress
that enacted the first Copyright Act in 1790 intended copyright to
be an engine of the First Amendment’s freedom of speech and of
the press.72 They did not intend copyright law to enable memory
holes.73 Even so, copyright law has evolved remarkably well for
that purpose.74

amounts if the defendant engaged in willful infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2). However, a
court can still award statutory damages even if the defendant unintentionally infringed. Id.
69. 17 U.S.C. § 502.
70. Jiarui Liu, Copyright Injunctions After eBay: An Empirical Study, 16 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 215, 222 (2012).
71. See Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in
Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 173–74 (1998); McKeown, supra note 5, at 5 (“I
refer to the use of copyright injunctions to impose what amounts to prior restraints
on offensive, unpopular or sensitive speech. These kinds of cases look, feel and smell like
the real First Amendment cases. They are fundamentally about censorship of
unpopular speech.”).
72. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985); see also
McKeown, supra note 5, at 1 (“[C]opyright and the First Amendment are both in tension and
in synergy with each other.”).
73. Ironically, copyright’s origin in the Stationer’s guild in England was to suppress
speech critical of the Crown. Tyler T. Ochoa & Mark Rose, The Anti-Monopoly Origins of the
Patent and Copyright Clause, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 909, 914 (2002). This law
evolved into the Statute of Anne in Britain and the Copyright Act in the United States, both
of which sought to promote expression rather than control it. Id. at 914, 929; cf. Shyamkrishna
Balganesh, Privative Copyright, 73 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (describing early
“censorial” roots by authors in copyright law).
74. Cf. Tehranian, supra note 51, at 251 (“[W]ould-be censors have converted losing
tort claims, such as defamation, false light, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress (immunized, as they are, by the First Amendment), into viable
copyright infringement claims that punish their foes for legitimate speech-related activity.”
(footnotes omitted)).
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III. HOW COPYRIGHT OWNERS EFFECTUATE MEMORY HOLES
This Part describes three legal strategies that copyright owners
have pursued to suppress unwanted content for reasons unrelated
to copyright law’s purpose. As the cases illustrate, plaintiffs
struggle to succeed on the merits of their copyright claims when
deploying these techniques.
Nevertheless, plaintiffs’ attempts cause substantial content
suppression for two reasons. First, many defendants remove
content upon demand rather than defend their positions in court.
As a result, merely by asserting the positions discussed in this Part,
copyright owners may effectively suppress content without any
judicial oversight. Second, when plaintiffs succeed with any one of
these positions, they establish a template that others may follow.
Part V will discuss ways to prevent both of these threats of content
suppression. This Part taxonomizes the positions to better
understand their mechanisms and flaws.
A. Acquisition Before Creation: The Case of Medical Justice
A person or business can seek to obtain copyright ownership
over works that have not been created yet. We call this “precreation acquisitions.”
Most pre-creation acquisitions are typical copyright
transactions that are part of the ordinary process of creating and
disseminating copyrighted works. For example, companies
routinely retain contractors to perform services and prospectively
obtain copyright ownership over the materials produced by the
contractors.75 This quid pro quo—payment in exchange for new
works—advances copyright’s goals by encouraging the production
of new socially valuable works that the hiring party uses to grow
its company’s enterprise. We are not concerned with these typical
copyright transactions.

75. A hiring party can obtain copyright ownership from third parties via contractual
assignment or as a “work made for hire.” 17 U.S.C. § 201 (2018). The primary copyright law
distinction between the two mechanisms is that assigned works are subject to a non-waivable
“termination of transfer” after thirty-five to forty years when the owner can take back
ownership of the work. Id. § 203. Works made for hire are not subject to that termination of
transfer. Id. § 203(a). This distinction isn’t material to this Article’s analysis, so we do not
distinguish between ownership acquired via assignment and works made for hire.
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In contrast, other types of pre-creation acquisitions can clearly
undermine copyright’s goals of incentivizing creation and
dissemination. Consider the example of suppressing online
reviews of service providers through pre-creation acquisition.
In the 2000s, online review of healthcare providers became
more prevalent. This concerned healthcare providers in part
because they felt like the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) limited their ability to rebut
patient reviews.76 In response to this perceived limitation, an
organization called Medical Justice offered a form contract that
healthcare providers could adopt; the form required patients to
assign copyright in any as-of-yet unwritten reviews of their
healthcare provider.77 The healthcare provider could then assert its
acquired copyright interest in those reviews to remove any
unwanted reviews from the Internet—effectuating copyright’s
memory hole.78
Without Medical Justice’s workaround, Section 230 would
protect review websites from any healthcare provider’s demands
to remove unwanted patient reviews.79 However, by allowing
healthcare providers to frame their demands as copyright
infringement claims, the demands fall outside Section 230’s
immunity, which expressly excludes intellectual property claims.
Instead, the healthcare provider’s copyright demands implicate
the DMCA’s notice-and-takedown scheme. Review websites
would have to either accede to the healthcare provider’s

76. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191,
110 Stat. 1936.
77. The Back Story, DOCTORED REVIEWS, https://www.doctoredreviews.com/
patients/the-back-story/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2019).
78. The contract was named a “Mutual Agreement to Maintain Privacy,” but because
HIPAA already required that healthcare providers maintain their patients’ privacy, any
promise by the provider to maintain patient privacy was illusory. Myths: True or False: A
Closer Look at Some of Medical Justice’s Key Claims, DOCTORED REVIEWS,
https://www.doctoredreviews.com/medical-justice-myths/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2019).
79. E.g., Braverman v. Yelp, Inc., No. 155629/12 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 28, 2013) (dentist’s
failed lawsuit against Yelp over patient’s review); Reit v. Yelp!, Inc., 907 N.Y.S.2d 411 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2010) (doctor’s failed lawsuit against Yelp over patient’s review); see also Hassell
v. Bird, 420 P.3d 776 (Cal. 2018) (court cannot compel Yelp to remove defamatory review
of attorney).
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copyright takedown demands or forego their valuable DMCA safe
harbor protection.80
A combination of industry pressure, adverse litigation,
government regulation, and legislative reform doomed Medical
Justice’s purported copyright workaround. The Department of
Health and Human Services’ Office of Civil Rights issued an
opinion that doctors could not implement these copyright-frompatient transfers.81 Few healthcare providers asserted the contract
in court, but when they did the assertions were met with judicial
skepticism.82 Several review websites independently decided not to
honor the DMCA takedown notices predicated on Medical Justice’s
contract, signaling that they would be willing to forego the
DMCA’s safe harbors to protect their consumers’ free speech
rights.83 And the Federal Trade Commission received a complaint
that Medical Justice was falsely advertising the efficacy of its
contracts in light of these roadblocks.84 In response to these
developments, Medical Justice decided to “retire” its contracts,
and it advised its healthcare-provider customers to stop using
its forms.85
In 2016, Congress enacted the Consumer Review Fairness Act
(CRFA),86 which partially redresses the problems exposed by

80. The review sites would be responding to the doctors’ demands, not patients who
have changed their minds.
81. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Private Practice Ceases Conditioning of
Compliance
with
the
Privacy
Rule,
HHS,
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/forprofessionals/compliance-enforcement/examples/all-cases/index.html#case29
(last
visited Nov. 7, 2019).
82. E.g., Lee v. Makhnevich, No. 11 Civ. 8665(PAC), 2013 WL 1234829 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
27, 2013).
83. Eric Goldman, Top Internet Law Developments of 2011, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG
(Jan. 27, 2012), https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2012/01/top_internet_la.htm.
84. Complaint, Medical Justice Corp., filed before the Fed. Trade Comm’n,
https://cdt.org/files/pdfs/20111129_medjustice_complaint.pdf; see also Justin Brookman,
CDT Files FTC Complaint Against Medical Justice, CDT: BLOG (Nov. 29, 2011),
https://cdt.org/blog/cdt-files-ftc-complaint-against-medical-justice/.
85. Eric Goldman, Medical Justice Capitulates by “Retiring” Its Anti-Patient Review
Contracts, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Dec. 1, 2011), https://blog.ericgoldman.org/
archives/2011/12/medical_justice.htm.
86. Consumer Review Fairness Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-258, 130 Stat. 1355
(codified at 15 U.S.C. 45b (2018)). See generally Eric Goldman, Understanding the Consumer
Review Fairness Act of 2016, 24 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1 (2017) (explaining the
CRFA). California had previously enacted similar pro-consumer review legislation in 2014.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1670.8 (West Supp. 2019) (effective Jan. 1, 2015). However, unlike the CRFA,

949

002.GOLDMAN_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

7/17/20 12:37 PM

2019

Medical Justice’s technique. The CRFA expressly prohibits
businesses from using form contracts that “transfer[] or require[] an
individual who is a party to the form contract to transfer to
any person any intellectual property rights in review or
feedback content.”87 The CRFA makes any ongoing deployment of
Medical Justice’s form contracts, or any copycat efforts, ineffectual
and unlawful.
However, the CRFA does not eliminate the potential for precreation copyright acquisitions to suppress consumer reviews or
other types of content. First, the CRFA only applies to “form
contracts.”88 Businesses could individually negotiate contracts with
consumers to achieve the same outcome. Second, the CRFA does
not apply to restrictions on “unlawful” content,89 which might
include defamatory reviews that are otherwise protected by Section
230 and the First Amendment. This means that prospective
copyright assignments could target defamatory reviews for
suppression, avoiding hard-to-win defamation law to achieve the
same end.90 Third, the CRFA does not prevent contractual limits
based on trade secrets or confidentiality.91 Finally, the CRFA only
applies to “a written, oral, or pictorial review, performance
assessment of, or other similar analysis of, including by electronic
means, the goods, services, or conduct of a person.”92 There are
many other types of content that may be targeted for pre-creation
acquisition beyond this statutory scope. As such, although Medical
Justice’s copyright workaround failed and the CRFA banned any
efforts to redeploy it, many situations remain where pre-creation
copyright acquisition could be deployed to facilitate memory holes.

the California law does not expressly address prospective copyright assignments and may
not apply to them.
87. Consumer Review Fairness Act § 2(b)(1)(C).
88. Id. § 2(b)(1).
89. Id. § 2(b)(3)(D).
90. Goldman, supra note 85.
91. Consumer Review Fairness Act § 2(b)(3)(A); see Eric Goldman, Businesses Cannot
Contractually Ban “Abusive” Consumer Reviews, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (July 17, 2018),
https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2018/07/businesses-cannot-contractually-banabusive-consumer-reviews.htm.
92. Consumer Review Fairness Act § 2(a)(2).
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B. Post-Publication Acquisition Through Transfer
After content has been published, a person can try to suppress
it by acquiring and then asserting ownership of the content’s
copyright. Three cases from the Internet era illustrate different
ways that people have tried to deploy this technique.93
1. Scott v. WorldStarHipHop94
A student recorded a classroom brawl on his phone between
Mr. Scott (a student) and his current and former girlfriends and
then posted the recording to WorldStarHipHop, a user-generated
content video site similar to YouTube. The title of the posting was
“Disgraceful: College fight in NYC Breaks Out Between A Guy, His
Girl and Another Girl in Class! (Man Strong Arm’s [sic] The
Student. Hitting Her with Body Shots).”95
Unhappy about the video’s publication, Scott acquired the
video’s copyright from his classmate and demanded that
WorldStarHipHop remove the video. WorldStarHipHop refused,
likely foreclosing any DMCA safe harbor it might have claimed.
Scott sued WorldStarHipHop for copyright infringement, privacy
violations, publicity rights violations, and negligent infliction of
emotional distress. Two years into the case, the court dismissed the
privacy and other non-copyright claims.96
The copyright claim persisted for two more years, going
through several rounds of procedural and substantive motions.
Four years after first filing suit, the parties settled the copyright

93. These cases reflect the digital age, but there are similar cases from the pre-Internet
era, such as Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966), where
Howard Hughes acquired the copyright in a magazine article about himself to control its
reuse in an unauthorized biography.
94. Scott v. WorldStarHipHop, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 9538(PKC)(RLE), 2012 WL 5835232
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2012); Scott v. WorldStarHipHop, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 9538(PKC)(RLE), 2012
WL 1592229 (S.D.N.Y. May 3, 2012); Scott v. WorldStarHipHop, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 9538 PKC,
2011 WL 13079877 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2011); see also Eric Goldman, The Dangerous Meme That
Won’t Go Away: Using Copyright Assignments to Suppress Unwanted Content—Scott v.
WorldStarHipHop, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (May 14, 2012), http://blog.ericgoldman.
org/archives/2012/05/the_meme_that_w.htm.
95. Scott v. WorldStarHipHop, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 9538(PKC)(RLE), 2012 WL 1592229
(S.D.N.Y. May 3, 2012).
96. Id.
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claims on confidential terms.97 The two additional years of litigation
demonstrate the extra costs borne by the defendant specifically due
to the copyright claims compared to the parallel privacy and
reputation claims.
2. Katz v. Chevaldina98
Katz is a Florida real estate magnate and part-owner of the
Miami Heat professional basketball team. One of his tenants,
Chevaldina, published a blog post that criticized Katz’s
business practices. Chevaldina’s post included a photo she
copied and pasted from a newspaper website. The photo shows
Katz with his tongue hanging out of the side of his mouth.99 Katz
acquired the photo’s copyright and then sued Chevaldina for
copyright infringement.
After nearly four years of litigation, the district court ruled,100
and the appeals court affirmed,101 that Chevaldina’s publication of
the photo constituted fair use and awarded Chevaldina over
$150,000 of attorneys’ fees pursuant to copyright’s fee-shifting
provision.102 As part of its fair use analysis, the appeals court
highlighted the photo’s noncommercial and educational fair uses,
that is, to criticize Katz’s business practices.
The appeals court also explained that Chevaldina’s critical use
would not diminish the market value of the photo. Katz did not

97. Stipulation of Voluntary Dismissal, Scott v. WorldStarHipHop, Inc., No. 1:10-cv09538 (S.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 28, 2014), https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.
cgi?article=2867&context=historical.
98. Katz v. Google Inc., 802 F.3d 1178 (11th Cir. 2015); Katz v. Chevaldina, 111 U.S.P.Q.
2d 1281 (S.D. Fla. 2014); Katz v. Chevaldina, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1314 (S.D. Fla. 2012); see also Eric
Goldman, You Can’t Buy a Copyright, Just to Bury It, FORBES (Sept. 21, 2015, 11:59 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2015/09/21/you-cant-buy-a-copyright-justto-bury-it/.

99.
As the appeals court remarked, Katz’s “tongue protrudes askew from his mouth.” Katz v.
Google, 802 F.3d at 1180.
100. Katz v. Chevaldina, 111 U.S.P.Q.2d 1281 (S.D. Fla. 2014).
101. Katz v. Google, 802 F.3d at 1180.
102. For copyright’s fee-shifting provision, see 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2018).
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acquire the photo’s copyright to make money from its
dissemination, but rather to suppress its publication.
Chevaldina’s use of the Photo would not materially impair
Katz’s incentive to publish the work. Katz took the highly unusual
step of obtaining the copyright to the Photo and initiating this
lawsuit specifically to prevent its publication. Katz profoundly
distastes the Photo and seeks to extinguish, for all time, the
dissemination of his “embarrassing” countenance. Due to Katz’s
attempt to utilize copyright as an instrument of censorship against
unwanted criticism, there is no potential market for his work.103
In Katz and WorldStarHipHop, both plaintiffs sought to
permanently suppress embarrassing online content of which they
are the subject, not the author. However, the cases differ in two
important ways.
First, Katz was a public figure. He was sufficiently well-known
to be the subject of news before Chevaldina wrote about him. As a
result, compared to private figure Scott, Katz may have had
diminished privacy expectations, and his visibility strengthened
the argument in favor of Chevaldina’s fair use.
Second, the uploader in WorldStarHipHop granted the online
service copyright permission to publish the video before Scott
acquired the copyright, whereas Chevaldina never had
authorization to use the Katz photo because she copied it from the
Internet. As a result, in Katz, the photographer (or his copyright
assignee) who originally published the Katz photo could have sued
for Chevaldina’s subsequent and unauthorized use of the photo on
her blog. This difference seemingly tilts in favor of Katz, as in
theory he assumed the photographer’s existing right to sue
Chevaldina. However, the copyright transfer from the
photographer to Katz materially changed the reasons for the
copyright enforcement. The original photo publisher might have
sought to protect the photo’s licensing potential and the
photographer’s authorial interests in the photography. In contrast,
Katz used the copyright to permanently suppress embarrassing but
true content from the Internet that he had no role in generating or
interest in publishing.

103. Katz v. Google, 802 F.3d at 1184.

953

002.GOLDMAN_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

7/17/20 12:37 PM

2019

3. Small Justice v. Xcentric104
Small Justice involves the website Ripoff Report, which allows
users to post negative reviews of businesses. Ripoff Report differs
from most other user-generated content websites in three ways that
are material here. First, Ripoff Report requires authors to grant the
site an irrevocable and partially exclusive license to their
submissions. This makes Ripoff Report a partial copyright owner
of the submissions.105 Second, Ripoff Report does not provide
authors with any contractual or operational right to edit or delete
their content once submitted (unlike the WorldStarHipHop
service). Third, Ripoff Report has a policy that it will not remove
user submissions once published, even in the face of legal threats.106
A pseudonymous author published a negative review of the
Small Justice law firm on Ripoff Report, alleging improper personal
and professional conduct by the law firm.107 The law firm acquired
the copyright to the published review, purported to terminate the
copyright license to Ripoff Report, and when Ripoff Report did not
remove the review, sued Ripoff Report for copyright infringement.
What makes this case unusual is how Small Justice purportedly
acquired copyright ownership of the content it sought to
suppress. Because the review author was pseudonymous, Small
Justice could not directly negotiate an acquisition of the
104. Small Justice LLC v. Xcentric Ventures LLC, 873 F.3d 313 (1st Cir. 2017); Small
Justice LLC v. Xcentric Ventures LLC, 99 F. Supp. 3d 190 (D. Mass. 2015); Small Justice LLC
v. Xcentric Ventures LLC, No. 13-CV-11701, 2014 WL 1214828 (D. Mass. Mar. 24, 2014); see
also Eric Goldman, First Circuit Rejects Copyright Workaround to Section 230—Small Justice v.
Ripoff Report, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Oct. 12, 2017), https://blog.ericgoldman.
org/archives/2017/10/first-circuit-rejects-copyright-workaround-to-section-230-smalljustice-v-ripoff-report.htm; Eric Goldman, The Latest Insidious Tactic to Scrub Online Consumer
Reviews, FORBES (July 23, 2013, 12:07 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/
2013/07/23/the-latest-insidious-tactic-to-scrub-online-consumer-reviews.
105. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining a “transfer of copyright ownership” to include an
assignment or exclusive license “of a copyright or of any of the exclusive rights comprised
in a copyright,” but expressly excluding nonexclusive licenses).
106. Terms of Service, RIPOFF REPORT, https://www.ripoffreport.com/terms-of-service
(last updated May 2, 2019) (“Ripoff Report is intended to be a permanent record of disputes,
including disputes which have been fully resolved. In order to maintain a complete record,
information posted on Ripoff Report, subject to the Terms outlined herein, will not be
removed. By posting information on Ripoff Report, you understand and agree that the
material you post will become part of Ripoff Report’s permanent record and will NOT be
removed even at your request.”).
107. The law firm’s principal is Richard Goren. For simplicity, we treat Goren and Small
Justice as a single plaintiff.
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copyright. Instead, Small Justice sued the pseudonymous author in
state court for libel and intentional interference with prospective
contractual relations (reinforcing that, like the other cases in this
Part, privacy/reputation concerns drove the speech-suppression
strategy). When the author failed to appear in the state case, Small
Justice obtained a default judgment against the author.
As a remedy for the default judgment, Small Justice convinced
the state court to award it the author’s copyright to the negative
review. Armed with copyright ownership, Small Justice demanded
that Ripoff Report erase the post or face copyright infringement
liability. Neither Small Justice nor the original review author had
the technical capacity to delete the post from the site. As a result,
Ripoff Report’s anti-removal policy virtually necessitated court
intervention for Small Justice to suppress the review.
Small Justice eventually lost the suit in federal court and could
not compel suppression of the negative review about the law
firm.108 Nonetheless, this case highlights numerous problems with
post-publication copyright acquisition and enforcement that are
likely to repeat often.
First, state courts almost never see federal copyright cases
(because federal courts have original jurisdiction over federal
copyright cases),109 so the Small Justice state court’s mistaken
transfer of the copyright110 is not that surprising—especially on a
default judgment when the defendant is not around to point out the
court’s error.
Second, most online services take only nonexclusive licenses
that can be canceled by the user (usually by logging into the account
and deleting the content). When the online service has only a
nonpermanent and nonexclusive license, the copyright owner—
even if it acquires the copyright post-publication—may have the
legal grounds to terminate the license with the online service and
expose it to copyright infringement risk. Ripoff Report is relatively
unusual in that it attempts to take a permanent ownership stake in
user submissions.
108. Small Justice LLC v. Xcentric Ventures LLC, 873 F.3d 313 (1st Cir. 2017).
109. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2018).
110. 17 U.S.C. § 201(e) (2018) (“[N]o action by any governmental body or other official
or organization purporting to seize, expropriate, transfer, or exercise rights of ownership
with respect to the copyright, or any of the exclusive rights under a copyright, shall be given
effect under this title . . . .”).
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Third, pseudonymous and anonymous authors present service
of process issues. It is not surprising that the pseudonymous author
of the Small Justice negative review did not appear in court111
because there is a good chance he or she was not properly identified
or served. In cases involving pseudonymous or anonymous
authors who do not appear to contest lawsuits against them, judges
do not benefit from the adversarial error correction on which our
adjudication system is predicated.
Fourth, default judgments create other abuse possibilities.
Professor Eugene Volokh has documented dozens of times that
plaintiffs obtained or forged illegitimate default judgments to get
court-ordered content removals.112 To increase the odds of winning
these court orders, a plaintiff can intentionally sue the wrong
defendant (especially when the author is pseudonymous) to ensure
that no defendant appears to contest the lawsuit. Or, a plaintiff can
sue defendants who would be embarrassed or harmed by having
the content publicly attributed to them.113 Either way, the resulting
court orders are fundamentally invalid and can cause substantial
mischief. But no one may be willing or procedurally capable to
challenge the defective orders.
Fifth, most online content authors will not stand behind their
content when someone makes legal threats over it. They prefer
settlement to fighting back. This makes settlement particularly
attractive if all that is required is a copyright assignment, which has
little or no inherent financial or personal value to the author.114
111. Cf. Hassell v. Bird, 420 P.3d 776 (Cal. 2018) (raising questions about the legitimacy
of service of process for a pseudonymous author).
112. Revised Amicus Curiae Brief of Eugene Volokh in Support of Appellant, Hassell v.
Bird, 420 P.3d 776 (Cal. 2018) (No. S235968), https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=2484&context=historical; see also Paul Alan Levy, Multiple Fake
Consent Orders in Baltimore—Will Judges Remedy Their Own Prior Restraints Procured by Fraud?,
PUB. CITIZEN: CONSUMER L. & POL’Y BLOG (May 12, 2017), https://pubcit.typepad.
com/clpblog/2017/05/multiple-fake-consent-orders-in-baltimore-will-judges-remedytheir-own-prior-restraints-procured-by-.html; Manhattan Businessman Sentenced to Nine
Months in Prison for Forging Federal Court Orders to Remove Negative Reviews from Internet
Search Results, U.S. DEPT. JUSTICE (Oct. 19, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/usaosdny/pr/manhattan-businessman-sentenced-nine-months-prison-forging-federal-courtorders-remove.
113. Strike 3 Holdings, LLC v. Doe, 351 F. Supp. 3d 160 (D.D.C. 2018) (discussing how
a copyright troll deliberately takes advantage of the defendants’ potential embarrassment to
extract settlements).
114. In this respect, efforts to create copyright memory holes may resemble and take
advantage of the practice of copyright trolling. See, e.g., Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Uneasy
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The threaten-and-settle technique makes it easy—perhaps too
easy—for people unhappy with copyrighted works to take
possession of the copyright and weaponize it to proliferate
copyright’s memory holes.
Despite suppression efforts often failing, for the reasons
discussed in this section, post-publication suppression efforts are
costly and present a clear danger of persistent information
distortion. Copyright law can be easily abused by plaintiffs because
of the federal law’s complexity, the likelihood of default judgments,
and the cost and nuisance of litigation. These case outcomes may
seem like common sense to most lawyers, but the proliferation of
these cases, their time to resolution, and the basic procedural
maneuvers on which they are based, raise real concerns about
copyright law’s ongoing and persistent use as a suppression tool.
C. Acquisition Through Depiction
A third way a person may suppress a copyrighted work that
depicts them is by claiming to own the copyright by authoring the
work. We call this authorship-through-depiction.
Some authorship-through-depiction ownership situations are
ordinary and appropriate. If the depicted person superintended the
work, controlled its arrangement and production, and authorized
fixation of the work, it would be expected and reasonable for the
person to own the copyright.115 For example, musicians or dancers
may own copyrights in their live performances if they make a
simultaneous recording of the performance.116
In contrast, we are concerned when depicted people claim to
author their performances simply by being depicted and then assert
the performance copyright to control the recordings depicting
them. These mutant authorship-through-depiction claims can turn
copyright on its head, stripping control of the work from the

Case Against Copyright Trolls, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 723 (2013); Matthew Sag, Copyright Trolling,
an Empirical Study, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1105 (2015).
115. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 61 (1884); Lindsay v. The
Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel R.M.S. Titanic, No. 97 Civ. 9248(HB), 1999 WL 816163
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 1999).
116. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018) (defining “fixed” works).
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intended copyright owner and giving that control to the depicted
person (or persons), who can use it to suppress the work.117
Consider how an authorship-through-depiction argument may
have appeared in the WorldStarHipHop situation discussed above.
Scott, the fist-fighting boyfriend caught on video, could assert that
he had a copyright in his fighting movements, so publishing a video
depicting the brawl infringed copyright in those movements. This
would give him control over the video’s publication without the
cost or other hassles of post-creation acquisition from the
videographer. As we have already seen, even if the pugilist’s
copyright claim is dubious, a colorable argument can be
weaponized for years.
Based on black-letter copyright law, these arguments for
copyright authorship and ownership through depiction should fail.
First, copyright only protects “original works of authorship,”118 and
it is unlikely a spontaneous sequence of fighting movements would
satisfy this standard.119 Second, federal copyright law only protects
“fixed” works that are recorded in a tangible medium.120 Videorecording would ordinarily qualify as a fixation method. However,
to properly fix a recording requires that it was made “by or under
the authority of the author.”121 Scott, making an authorship-like
claim over a fixed work, cannot legitimately assert that his
classmate’s independent video-recording of the fight was made
under his authority. As such, Scott cannot claim copyright in the
recording. He never fixed his fighting moves, so federal copyright

117. More frequently, people can control their images through right of publicity, which
has direct roots in privacy law but has evolved over the twentieth century to overlap with
both copyright and trademark law. See JENNIFER E. ROTHMAN, THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY:
PRIVACY REIMAGINED FOR A PUBLIC WORLD (2018). For discussions of photographic subjects
asserting rights in their images as against photographers, see Jessica Silbey, Control over
Contemporary Photography: A Tangle of Copyright, Right of Publicity, and the First Amendment,
42 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 351 (2019); Eva E. Subotnik, The Author Was Not an Author:
The Copyright Interests of Photographic Subjects from Wilde to Garcia, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS
449 (2016).
118. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
119. See, e.g., Bikram’s Yoga Coll. of India, L.P. v. Evolation Yoga, LLC, 803 F.3d 1032,
1044 (9th Cir. 2015) (denying protection to a sequence of yoga poses because, among other
reasons, “‘successions of bodily movement’ often serve basic functional purposes”). Compare
with Bambauer, supra note 4, at 2070–78 (advocating to treat unscripted sexual activity as
authorship).
120. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
121. Id. § 101 (defining “fixed” works).
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law does not protect those moves separately from the video itself,
and the videographer owns the copyright to that.122
While the WorldStarHipHop pugilist’s copyright claim might
seem fanciful, the facts of Garcia v. Google123 may appear more
sympathetic to the claimant. The legal claims are equally
unmeritorious, however.
Garcia involved a movie entitled The Innocence of Muslims. The
movie producer retained actress Cindy Lee Garcia originally to
appear in a video called Desert Warrior. Allegedly, Garcia and the
producer never signed a written contract. The producer
misrepresented to Garcia the nature of the final video; instead of
being a story about life in Egypt 2000 years ago, the producer made
a video with an anti-Muslim message. That video included a five
second clip of her performance, but the producer dubbed antiMuslim words over her clip. As a result, the public video did not
include Garcia’s voice or recorded dialogue; it only depicted her
likeness and movements.
The producer posted the video to YouTube. Garcia’s
depiction in the published video led to a fatwa condemning her
(and others involved in the video) to death, resulting in death
threats against her.
Seeking to remove the movie from YouTube, Garcia sued
YouTube in state court for a variety of privacy torts.124 These claims
were preempted by Section 230, so the trial court denied a request
for a temporary restraining order taking down the video.125
This ruling pushed Garcia to seek legal alternatives that would
avoid Section 230’s immunity. As a result, Garcia dropped her
privacy claims.126 Instead, she claimed she owned a copyright in her
acting performance and sent multiple takedown notices to
122. Federal copyright law does restrict the unauthorized recording of (unfixed) live
musical performances (bootlegging). Id. § 1101(a). Many states have analogous statutes.
123. Garcia v. Google, Inc., 743 F.3d 1258 (9th Cir. 2014), amended by 766 F.3d 929 (9th
Cir. 2014); rev’d en banc, 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015). Professor Goldman contributed to
amicus briefs encouraging the Ninth Circuit to take the case en banc and reverse the threejudge panel ruling. Brief of Amici Curiae Internet Law Professors in Support of Google, Inc.
and YouTube, LLC’s Petition for Rehearing En Banc, Garcia v. Google, Inc., 743 F.3d 1258
(9th Cir. 2014) (No. 12-57302).
124. Complaint, Garcia v. Nakoula, No. BC492358 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 19, 2012),
http://www.dmlp.org/sites/citmedialaw.org/files/2012-09-19-Complaint.pdf.
125. Garcia v. Nakoula, No. BC492358 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 20, 2012), http://www.
dmlp.org/sites/citmedialaw.org/files/2012-09-20-Order%20denying%20TRO.pdf.
126. Garcia v. Google, 786 F.3d at 738.
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YouTube under the DMCA for unlawful publication of her
allegedly copyrighted work.127 YouTube refused the takedown
request on the basis that the filmmaker, not Garcia, was the lawful
claimant under the DMCA. Garcia then filed suit in federal court128
alleging that she had a copyright in her acting performance and that
YouTube’s publication of the video infringed that copyright. The
district court denied her request for a preliminary injunction.129
On appeal, a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit issued an
overbroad and disturbingly secret takedown order to YouTube,130
apparently motivated by the death threats against Garcia. Then, the
Ninth Circuit reheard the case en banc and reversed the ruling in
favor of Garcia in a 10-1 decision.131
The en banc majority principally based its ruling on a conclusion
that movie actors do not have a copyright interest separate from the
movie recording, even when the actor does not have a written
agreement with the producer.132 The majority also noted the
obvious fixation problem:
For better or for worse, [the film producer] “fixed” Garcia’s
performance in the tangible medium . . . . However one might
characterize Garcia’s performance, she played no role in fixation.
On top of this, Garcia claims that she never agreed to the film’s
ultimate rendition or how she was portrayed in Innocence of

127. Id.
128. Complaint, Garcia v. Nakoula, No. CV 12-08315-MWF-VBKx, 2012 WL 12878355
(C.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2012).
129. Garcia v. Nakoula, No. 12-CV-08315-MWF-VBKx, 2012 WL 12878355 (C.D. Cal.
Nov. 30, 2012).
130. E.g., Venkat Balasubramani, In Its “Innocence of Muslims” Ruling, the Ninth Circuit
Is Guilty of Judicial Activism—Garcia v. Google, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Feb. 27, 2014),
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2014/02/in-its-innocence-of-muslims-ruling-theninth-circuit-is-guilty-of-judicial-activism-garcia-v-google.htm.
131. Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d at 733.
132. The Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances requires recognition of actors’
rights separate from the movie recording. See Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances,
WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, https://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/
beijing/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2019). The United States has signed the Beijing Treaty, but
Congress has not passed implementing legislation. WIPO-Administered Treaties, WORLD
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, https://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.
jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=841 (last visited Nov. 7, 2019). For a recent analysis of how actors
may claim copyright in their performance, see Justin Hughes, Actors as Authors in American
Copyright Law, 51 CONN. L. REV. 1 (2019).
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Muslims, so she can hardly argue that the film or her cameo in it
was fixed “by or under [her] authority.”133

The court concluded that “Garcia’s harms are too attenuated
from the purpose of copyright” and denied her copyright claim and
request for relief.134
Important for our purposes, the majority understood that
Garcia was using copyright as an end-run around privacy law:
Privacy laws, not copyright, may offer remedies tailored to
Garcia’s personal and reputational harms. On that point, we offer
no substantive view. Ultimately, Garcia would like to have her
connection to the film forgotten and stripped from YouTube.
Unfortunately for Garcia, such a “right to be forgotten,” although
recently affirmed by the Court of Justice for the European Union,
is not recognized in the United States.135

The majority made particular note of how copyright can
effectuate prior restraints, “the least tolerable infringement on First
Amendment rights.”136
[The panel’s takedown order] gave short shrift to the First
Amendment values at stake. The mandatory injunction censored
and suppressed a politically significant film—based upon a
dubious and unprecedented theory of copyright. In so doing, the
panel deprived the public of the ability to view firsthand, and
judge for themselves, a film at the center of an international
uproar.
. . . The panel’s takedown order of a film of substantial interest to
the public is a classic prior restraint of speech.137

Without explicitly addressing the privacy or copyright overlap,
the court concluded that caution must be taken when copyright is

133. Garcia v. Google, 786 F.3d at 744.
134. Id. at 746.
135. Id. at 745. As Judge McKeown later wrote, “[T]here was a fundamental mismatch
between Garcia’s claimed harm (death threats and reputational harm) and the purpose of
the copyright laws (to stimulate creative expression, not to protect secrecy). . . . [C]opyright
laws were not the right vehicle for her legitimate beef . . . .” McKeown, supra note 5, at 7
(footnote omitted).
136. Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976).
137. Garcia v. Google, 786 F.3d at 747 (citing Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544,
550 (1993)); see also Amended Order, Garcia v. Google, Inc., No. 12-57302 (9th Cir. 2015)
(Judge Reinhardt’s dissent to the denial of an emergency en banc rehearing, expanding on the
multitudinous First Amendment problems with the takedown order).
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used to suppress content on the Internet. The doctrine and purpose
must align, and when other claims are more germane, such as
privacy torts, those remedies should be considered instead.138
We agree. For reasons related to sound copyright policy
(production, dissemination, and progression of knowledge),
copyright claims like Garcia’s should be swiftly dismissed.139
Failure of copyright claims does not affect the success or failure of
the appropriate tort claims, however.140 It is to those we now turn.
IV. REFLECTING PRIVACY VALUES IN COPYRIGHT LAW
As this Article demonstrates, there is significant interest in
using copyright law as a memory hole.141 And as Professor
Margaret Chon has said, “privacy concerns have always been a
part, albeit a minor aspect, of copyright law.”142 So under what
conditions should copyright actually facilitate memory holes? This
Part identifies the social values that privacy law protects and the
circumstances in which those values coincide with proper
copyright claims.

138. For contrary perspectives about the breadth of actors as copyright authors, see, for
example, F. Jay Dougherty, Not a Spike Lee Joint? Issues in the Authorship of Motion Pictures
Under U.S. Copyright Law, 49 UCLA L. R EV . 225, 228, 306 (2001); Hughes, supra note 132.
139. Copyright claims can be asserted for reputation or privacy-related reasons in other
ways beyond the three we discuss. For example, purported employers or joint-authors, both
exaggerating their rights under the work-for-hire or joint-authorship doctrines, can attempt
work-arounds of ownership and authorship rules in order to suppress speech for privacy
and reputational reasons. Both of these doctrines avoid the otherwise-strong statute of frauds
rule for copyright transfers, 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (2018), and may provide sympathetic factual
bases for ruling in the copyright claimant’s favor. To the extent that these doctrines seek to
suppress content for reasons unrelated to “promot[ing] the progress of science and the useful
arts,” they should also fail. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. These cases concern dubious attempts
at copyright acquisition to assert rights unrelated to authorship. Consumers or depicted
subjects who are also copyright authors and seek to retract their own expression or prevent
distortion of their expression present a separate, but related, issue, addressed infra Part B.
140. See Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1990).
141. Other articles addressing the copyright/privacy overlap include: Balganesh, supra
note 73; Chon, supra note 4; Gilden, supra note 4; Patrick R. Goold, Unbundling the “Tort” of
Copyright Infringement, 102 VA. L. REV. 1833 (2016); Gordon, supra note 7; Keller, supra note
51; Edward Lee, Suspect Assertions of Copyright, 15 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 379 (2016);
McKeown, supra note 5; Pamela Samuelson, Protecting Privacy Through Copyright Law?, in
PRIVACY IN THE MODERN AGE: THE SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS 191 (Marc Rotenberg et al. eds.,
2015); Ned Snow, A Copyright Conundrum: Protecting Email Privacy, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 501
(2007); Tehranian, supra note 51; Tushnet, supra note 4.
142. Chon, supra note 4.
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A. A Taxonomy of Privacy Interests
The U.S. Constitution provides a baseline set of principles for
protecting privacy. The Bill of Rights, in particular, defines
boundaries between the individual and the state that shape our
fundamental right to privacy as well as its relationship to the right
of free speech.143
Although constitutional interpretation is flexible to ensure
relevance for future generations, it is also grounded in textual
promises in the Bill of Rights, as well as fundamental values such
as liberty and autonomy.144 Meant “to be adapted to the various
crises of human affairs,” the U.S. Constitution is a “great outline”
that delimits (through its federalism structure and its protection of
individual rights) basic principles for negotiating the relationship
between individual freedoms, regulated group behavior, and
government (state and federal) power.145
Through constitutional interpretation, privacy has been
inextricably linked to these fundamental values in cases such as
Meyer v. Nebraska (1923) (protecting a person’s choice to direct
education of one’s children),146 Griswold v. Connecticut (1965)
(protecting a person’s choice to use birth control),147 and Katz v.
United States (1967) (reasonable expectation of privacy in telephone
calls).148 Furthermore, privacy itself acts as a cornerstone of

143. ANITA L. ALLEN, UNPOPULAR PRIVACY: WHAT MUST WE HIDE? 4 (Cheshire
Calhoun ed. 2011) (describing everyday meanings of privacy that “fall into a handful of
easily illustrated categories,” partially tracking the constitutional protection against
governmental intrusion of physical and spatial privacy and decisional and associational
privacy); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Rediscovering Brandeis’s Right to Privacy, 45 BRANDEIS
L.J. 643 (2007) (identifying deeply rooted constitutional privacy concepts).
144. Equality as a fundamental value did not return to the Constitution until after the
Civil War and the Fourteenth Amendment, but it originated as a national value in the
Declaration of Independence.
145. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407, 415 (1819).
146. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (holding unconstitutional a state law that
prohibits teaching in a school any language but English because the law intrudes into
childrearing privacy and autonomy).
147. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S 479 (1965) (identifying a “zone of privacy”
through the Bill of Rights, the Ninth Amendment, and the concept of “ordered liberty” in
the Fourteenth Amendment that protects a married couple’s decision from state intrusion
concerning whether to use contraception and bear children).
148. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 58–59 (1967).
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constitutional rights and civil liberties today.149 These cases and
others developed the right of privacy throughout the twentieth
century to reflect industrial, medical, and technological advances.
Since the mid-twentieth century, the Supreme Court has used
the concept of “reasonable expectations of privacy” to interpret
society’s evolving needs and desires for privacy in light of
these changes.150
Supreme Court case law interpreting the Constitution’s Bill of
Rights describes how it advances privacy interests in several
identifiable categories.
1. Spaces and things
The Third and Fourth Amendments protect privacy for a
person’s spaces and things,151 including one’s “houses, papers, and
effects.”152 This protection has expanded over time to include
chattel, such as cars and cellphones.153 This privacy interest may
provide the strongest case for recognition in copyright law as a way
to protect intangible works of expression embodied (or “fixed”) in
tangible property.
2. Bodies
Constitutional privacy also protects various aspects of a
person’s body, including restrictions on forced medical treatments,
bodily searches, and reproduction or sterilization.154 Copyright law

149. NEIL M. RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY: RETHINKING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE
DIGITAL AGE 5–7 (2015) (harmonizing civil liberties of privacy and free speech); see also
Carpenter v. United States, No. 16-402, slip. op. at 12 (2018) (extending Fourth Amendment
protections to new technologies and relationships with technology intermediaries that
enable an unforeseen ability to track “familiar, political, professional, religious, and sexual
associations” from location records that “hold for many Americans the ‘privacies of life’”)
(citations omitted).
150. Katz, 389 U.S. at 358–59 (search of telephone communication subject to limitation
of “reasonable expectation of privacy” in those communications, extending Fourth
Amendment protection to new technologies).
151. See Laura K. Donohue, The Fourth Amendment in a Digital World, 71 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 553 (2016).
152. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
153. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014) (search of cell phone requires warrant);
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (search of car violated Fourth Amendment).
154. See Jamal Greene, The So-Called Right to Privacy, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 715 (2010)
(tracing the right to privacy from Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S 479 (1965), to Lawrence
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is not a good candidate for protecting a person’s interests in their
physical body.155 However, copyright law sometimes protects
depictions of people, and that protection can implicate bodily
integrity and autonomy. We discuss in Part IV.B the doctrinal
difficulty raised by these cases, especially with post-publication
retraction attempts.
3. Beliefs and relationships
The right to privacy also extends to a person’s relationships
and beliefs via the First Amendment and its penumbra.156 This
can include spiritual and intellectual privacy when the state’s
intrusion into religion and political association degrades
intellectual freedom.157
Courts often apply the First Amendment and the Fourteenth
Amendment together to protect privacy in personal relationships.
For example, the Supreme Court recently declared that states
cannot criminalize consensual sexual adult intimacy because doing
so “demean[s] [people’s] existence or control[s] their destiny by
making their private sexual conduct a crime.”158 The Supreme
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), by looking at its role in abortion jurisprudence and sexual
liberty rights).
155. Cf. Aaron Perzanowski, Tattoos & IP Norms, 98 MINN. L. REV. 511 (2013) (discussing
some of the problems with providing copyright protection for tattoos); Yolanda M. King, The
Challenges “Facing” Copyright Protection for Tattoos, 92 OR. L. REV. 129 (2013); Yolanda M. King,
The Enforcement Challenges for Tattoo Copyrights, 22 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 29 (2014).
156. See Chemerinsky, supra note 143, at 646.
157. LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1160–61 (2d ed. 1988) (“The
free exercise clause was at the very least designated to guarantee freedom of conscience by
preventing any degree of compulsion in matters of belief.”); see also RICHARDS, supra
note 149.
158. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2016) (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at
578). One root of these privacy cases is Griswold v. Connecticut, as Justice Roberts states in his
dissent in Obergefell.
The majority suggests that “there are other, more instructive precedents”
informing the right to marry. Although not entirely clear, this reference seems to
correspond to a line of cases discussing an implied fundamental “right of privacy.”
Griswold, 381 U.S., at 486. In the first of those cases, the Court invalidated a criminal
law that banned the use of contraceptives. Id. at 485–486. The Court stressed the
invasive nature of the ban, which threatened the intrusion of “the police to search
the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms.” Id. at 485. In the Court’s view, such
laws infringed the right to privacy in its most basic sense: the “right to be let
alone.” Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453–54 n.10 (1972) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting).
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Court declared marriage one of the “great relations in private
life”159 and what goes on in the bedroom is protected by privacy
“in its most basic sense.”160 Indeed, many friendships, families
and intimacies—the bonds of civil society—are unimaginable
without privacy.161
Copyrighted works may represent, critique, or expose an
author’s or other person’s beliefs and relationships. The desire to
control the public presentation of these beliefs and relationships
leads some to want to temporarily or permanently suppress
copyrighted content (and the facts and ideas it contains). Protecting
people’s beliefs and relationships is a key value for privacy law, but
these interests can collide with other important social interests and
fundamental values, such as free speech, facilitating knowledge
and scientific progress, and the intellectual autonomy of speakers.
In Part IV.B, we discuss cases concerning this collision and
advocate for limiting copyright’s ability to suppress alreadypublished information concerning relationships and beliefs,
despite their sometimes-private nature.
4. Personal Information
Privacy
in
personal
information
remains
weakly
constitutionalized, but a growing number of statutes regulate
personal data and information. Alan Westin’s seminal book Privacy
and Freedom described circles of personal information: that which
we tell no one (innermost circle); that which we tell only our
intimates (next innermost circle); and so on until there is
information known to everyone.162 Today, federal and state statutes
draw these circles for us around educational information, health
information, and financial information, for example. However, to

Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2619–20 (Roberts, J. dissenting) (some citations omitted).
159. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2613 (Roberts, J. dissenting) (quoting William Blackstone’s
commentaries).
160. Id. at 2620.
161. Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 477 (1968) (“Privacy is not merely a good
technique for furthering these fundamental relations; rather without privacy they are simply
inconceivable.”).
162. ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 33 (1967).
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date, the constitutional right to protect personal factual information
does not exist.163
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has addressed the privacy
intrusion of the aggregation of information in photographs, emails,
telephone contacts, physical movements, and “familial, political,
professional, religious and sexual associations” contained
therein.164 Preventing government from accessing the private
collection (by a cellphone company) of massive amounts of factual
information—e.g., geographic locations and phone calls—
implicates the right of privacy.165
What counts as “personal information” subject to regulation
and protection from governmental intrusion and forced
divulgation reflects contemporary concerns.166 The origins of this
debate about the fundamental protection of personal information is
commonly attributed to the 1890 Harvard Law Review article, The
Right to Privacy, by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis.167 This was
around the time of the popularity of the “snap camera” and the rise
of yellow journalism, which collectively made it possible for the
penny press to broadly expose an individual’s private life.168
Warren and Brandeis wrote:
Recent inventions and business methods call attention to the next
step which must be taken for the protection of the person, and for
securing to the individual what Judge Cooley calls the right “to
be let alone.” Instantaneous photographs and newspaper
enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of private and
domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices threaten to make

163. Chemerinsky, supra note 143, at 649–51 (describing the various constitutional
spheres of privacy and how information privacy has yet to be included except statutorily).
164. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018) (quoting United States v.
Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012)) (describing privacy invasions from searching location data
and content of personal cell phones).
165. Id.
166. Chemerinsky, supra note 143, at 649. For a discussion of how to determine whether
a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy for private information shared under a
theory of social networks, see Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72
U. CHI. L. REV. 919 (2005).
167. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890).
168. Id. at 195.

967

002.GOLDMAN_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

7/17/20 12:37 PM

2019

good the prediction that “what is whispered in the closet shall be
proclaimed from the house-tops.”169

In response to these new technological developments, Warren
and Brandeis proposed a “right to privacy” that “secures to each
individual the right of determining, ordinarily, to what extent his
thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to
others.”170 They disconnect this right to privacy in personal
information from copyrighted works, regardless of the work’s
“nature or value.”171 They say:
Under our system of government, [a person] can never be
compelled to express [his thoughts, sentiments and emotions]
(except when upon the witness-stand); and even if he has chosen
to give them expression, he generally retains the power to fix the
limits of the publicity which shall be given them. The existence of
this right does not depend upon the particular method of
expression adopted. It is immaterial whether it be by word or by
signs, in painting, by sculpture, or in music. Neither does the
existence of the right depend upon the nature or value of the
thought or emotion, nor upon the excellence of the means of
expression. The same protection is accorded to a casual letter or
an entry in a diary and to the most valuable poem or essay, to a
botch or daub and to a masterpiece. In every such case the
individual is entitled to decide whether that which is his shall be
given to the public. No other has the right to publish his
productions in any form, without his consent. This right is wholly
independent of the material on which, the thought, sentiment, or
emotion is expressed.172

Other than recent United States Supreme Court cases protecting
individuals from the state’s intrusive collection of aggregated
information without a warrant—through GPS tracking or cell
phone towers, for example—no constitutional right to protect the
privacy of personal information has yet arisen from the Warren and
Brandeis article.173 Instead, over the past century, we have seen
169. Id.
170. Id. at 198.
171. Id. at 199. For a critique of Warren and Brandeis’ analysis of copyright as excluding
privacy interests and their insufficient consideration of the authorial interests in “censorial
copyright” claims, see Balganesh, supra note 73.
172. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 167, at 198–99 (citations omitted).
173. See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018) (government
collection of third-party cellphone tower data for a suspect is subject to Fourth Amendment
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the proliferation and widespread recognition of four privacy
torts: public disclosure of private facts, false light,
misappropriation (commonly called “publicity rights”), and
intrusion into seclusion.174
Warren and Brandeis acknowledged several First Amendment
caveats to their argument for a right to privacy, including: (1)
matters that are in the “public or general interest” (an admittedly
broad category), and (2) “publication of the facts by the individual,
or with his consent.”175 The common law privacy tort doctrines
incorporate these concerns by including First Amendment defenses
that reflect the prerogative of the freedom of speech and press.
Common law privacy torts are further constrained by federal
copyright preemption.176 By definition, copyright does not protect
facts or ideas, whether or not those facts or ideas were private or
previously undisclosed.177 Accordingly, copyright’s federal
preemption of overlapping state law prevents state-based torts
from providing copyright-like protection for facts and ideas.178
Despite these limitations, privacy law and theory has grown in
importance over the past several decades alongside major
technological
developments.
Contemporary
theories
of
“intellectual privacy” extend Warren and Brandeis’ article by
claiming a “right to be let alone,” making strong arguments for
protecting private conversations and spaces. Such a right would
foment the ability to think and develop ideas without social and
political constraints, especially in a world more crowded than ever
with
surveillance
and
privacy-reducing
technology.179
Contemporary intellectual privacy, a mixture of the forms of
privacy described above, is said to protect the “diversity of
personal choices and actions,”180 promote social order through the
scrutiny); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (GPS tracking of a suspect’s car without
a warrant violates the Fourth Amendment).
174. Daniel J. Solove, A Brief History of Information Privacy Law, in PROSKAUER ON
PRIVACY §§ 1.3–1.4 (Kristen J. Mathews ed., 2006). A fifth tort, breach of confidence, is not
widely recognized. Id. at § 1.4.1[A][2][d]. See also Prosser, supra note 17, at 389.
175. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 167, at 214, 218.
176. See 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2012).
177. See id. § 102(b).
178. See id. § 301.
179. RICHARDS, supra note 149.
180. HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE
INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 77 (2010).
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flourishing of debate (which is essential to democratic selfgovernment), bind communities together around shared interests
despite individualized differences, and foster the production of
aesthetic and scientific goods.181 In the digital age, the demands for
these forms of privacy have only grown louder.
As the exponential growth of digital data has increased interest
in constitutional and statutory privacy law, copyright law finds
itself more often pressed into service to protect personal
information and intellectual privacy. As a result, the “partnership”
of privacy and copyright creates troubling tensions for copyright
doctrine understood to promote the public dissemination of
expression and knowledge.
B. When Should Copyright Facilitate Memory Holes?
The previous section categorized constitutional privacy
interests and traced their intersections with copyright law. This
subpart considers when copyright protection should incorporate
privacy considerations, i.e., when the pairing of privacy and
copyright law makes sense in terms of aligned policy goals.182 We
approach this by considering four types of works: (1) neverpublished or disseminated works, (2) limited-dissemination
works, (3) nostalgic remembrances by heirs, and (4) photographs
and videos.
1. Never-disseminated works
Copyright law has long protected an author’s decision about
how and when to first publish his or her works. Unauthorized
publication of unpublished works formed the basis of a key

181. Id. at 86–88 (citing PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY (1995)).
182. We focus on liability considerations, but there may be other helpful interplays
between copyright and privacy doctrines. Cf. j. remy green, A (Nude) Picture is Worth a
Thousand Words—But How Many Dollars?: Using Copyright as a Metric for Harm in “Revenge
Porn” Cases, 45 RUTGERS L. REC. 170 (2018) (arguing that copyright damages are a good way
of measuring harm in nonconsensual pornography cases); Keller, supra note 51 (copyright
remedies could provide a model for remedies in online privacy violations).
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eighteenth-century British copyright case,183 which concluded that
the core right of copyright is the author’s right to first publication.184
Publishing a work without the author’s permission can harm
the author in several ways. Prior to 1978, publication was a
prerequisite for federal copyright protection (unpublished works
were only eligible for protection under state/common law).185
Unauthorized publication divested the author of copyright
protection, including the decision whether the work should be
published at all.186 Unauthorized publication also preempts the
author’s decision about what constitutes the final version of a work,
including what details it includes or excludes. If the work was
never intended for publication, unauthorized publication may
disclose the private information of the author and others, invading
the author’s intellectual privacy.187 This may discourage authors
from recording their thoughts as part of intellectual exploration
and knowledge dissemination. These potentially significant
unwanted consequences contravene copyright’s purpose. For these
reasons, Congress and the courts strongly protect authors’ first
publication decisions.188

183. E.g., Pope v. Curl, (1741) 26 Eng. Rep. 608; 2 Atk. 342; see also Mark Rose, The Author
in Court: Pope v. Curll (1741), 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 475 (1992).
184. For a history of the right of first publication in copyright, see Deborah R. Gerhardt,
Copyright Publication: An Empirical Study, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 135, 140–142 (2011).
185. Gordon, supra note 7, at 45–46.Because copyrights are now principally governed
by federal law, we do not address past or current state/common-law copyrights. Unlike the
federal statute, state common-law copyright statutes do not necessarily advance the U.S.
Constitution’s aim to “promote the progress of science and the useful arts.” See, e.g., Zvi S.
Rosen, Common-Law Copyright, 85 U. CIN. L. REV. 1055, 1061 (2018) (demonstrating the
significant breadth and scope of state common-law copyright compared to federal
copyright). Also, federal copyright law expressly preempts inconsistent state laws. 17 U.S.C.
§ 301 (2012). To the extent federal copyright law conflicts with some forms of privacy claims
to suppress copyrighted works as works, any residual common law copyrights should be
preempted. See, for example, ROTHMAN, supra note 117, arguing for the separation of privacy
and copyright to protect different interests in the digital age.
186. Gerhardt, supra note 184, at 136 (describing consequences of uncontrolled
publishing—in this case without notice or registration—of Martin Luther King, Jr.’s “I Have
a Dream” speech).
187. Balganesh, supra note 73; Keller, supra note 51.
188. E.g., 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (2012) (consideration of “nature of the work,” including its
unpublished status, is part of fair use analysis); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985); Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987)
(holding that an author’s control over unpublished letters supersedes third parties’ rights to
publish extracts under fair use).
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Thus, it seems appropriate to provide copyright protection for
unpublished works even when an author seeks to enforce those
rights for authorial privacy considerations. However, the privacy
interests should be qualified by copyright’s existing doctrinal
limits, such as the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use.189 We
discuss fair use in more detail in Part V.A.
Monge v. Maya Magazines illustrates the tensions between neverdisseminated works, privacy, and copyright. In Monge, a celebrity
singer and model sued a gossip magazine over dissemination
of wedding pictures leaked by an assistant.190 Though the singer did
not take the photographs, the court let her bring a copyright claim
anyway.191
The Ninth Circuit held that the photos’ potential
newsworthiness did not justify fair use,192 even though news
reporting normally qualifies for fair use.193 The court instead
concluded that the publication was not transformative and was
“undisputedly commercial in nature.”194 Even more significant, the
couple kept the photos secret—secluded, in constitutional privacy
parlance—from everyone, even their own families.195 The court
concluded that the right of first publication was stronger than the
public’s right to know.196 Further, the Court explicitly sidelined
privacy law:
Although the published photos were not highly artistic in nature,
they do have a defining and common characteristic—until Issue
633 hit the stands, they were unpublished. We pointedly note that
we address the unpublished status of the photos only under
copyright principles, not privacy law . . . . Maya’s publication

189. Following the Harper & Row decision, Congress amended the fair use statute to
say: “The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such a
finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.” 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
190. Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc., 688 F.3d 1164 (9th Cir. 2012).
191. Samuelson, supra note 141, at 194–95 (speculating that Monge purchased the
copyrights from the photographer).
192. Monge, 688 F.3d at 1176; cf. Núñez v. Caribbean Int’l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 22
(1st Cir. 2000).
193. Monge, 688 F.3d at 1173. See also 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (including “news reporting”
as exemplary of fair uses).
194. Id. at 1176.
195. Id. at 1169.
196. Id. at 1164.
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undoubtedly supplanted Plaintiffs’ right to control the first public
appearance of the photographs.197

The legal wrinkles in the plaintiff’s case—the plaintiff’s dubious
copyright ownership in the photos and the fact that a secret
wedding between two celebrities is news—did not persuade the
majority, despite a lengthy dissent.198 Indeed, but for the seclusion
interest, Monge v. Maya resembles the Supreme Court case of Harper
& Row v. Nation, in which the Court held that first publication of a
purloined manuscript detailing critical historical events was not
fair use.199
The Monge case provides a sympathetic set of facts for the
plaintiff, but so will most cases involving the unconsented first
publication of never-published works that may not have been
meant for publication. It is reasonable for copyright law to apply to
never-disseminated works that were “purloined” and published
for the first time by an unauthorized publisher, whether or not the
author or copyright owner ever intended to publicly disseminate
the work.
The ease of broad distribution on the Internet raises the
likelihood that more cases will be brought by sympathetic
plaintiffs, such as Cindy Lee Garcia, for whom the copyright claim
is weak but the sympathies for the plaintiff are strong. In those
cases, especially when there has been only limited publication
of the work as described more below, courts may be tempted
to stretch copyright law to rule in the plaintiff’s favor. For all
the reasons already discussed, we urge restraint to conform
with copyright’s ultimate aim of the “progress of science”
through dissemination.
2. Limited-dissemination works200
Never-disseminated works pose the most favorable situation
where the law should accommodate the overlaps between
copyright and privacy. However, such facts are relatively rare,
197. Id. at 1177–78 (quotation marks omitted). For critiques of this reasoning, see
Andrew Gilden, Copyright’s Market Gibberish, WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020); Balganesh,
supra note 73.
198. Monge, 688 F.3d at 1170 n.2.
199. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 561 (1985).
200. This subpart focuses on writings. A later subpart looks more closely at the
unauthorized dissemination of photographs and videos.
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especially in the Internet era. More common are “limiteddissemination” cases.
Copyrightable works can be disseminated on a limited basis,
something between never-disseminated (always in the author’s
possession) and fully published to the public. Indeed, limited
dissemination was fairly common historically.201 Many
copyrightable works, such as personal letters, were seen only by the
small number of people who had physical access to them.
These works remained with a limited audience intentionally or
because of the costs of reproducing the work onto new chattel and
distributing the chattel to third parties. Because chattel access
functionally limited the audience for the work, many copyrightable
works had some degree of de facto privacy.
Copyright law explicitly distinguishes ownership of the chattel
from ownership of copyrighted works that are part of the chattel.202
For example, the recipient of a physical letter owns the letter as
chattel but does not obtain any copyright interest to publish the
letter’s contents further.203 This divided ownership rule protects the
author’s privacy interest in expressing themselves by giving the
author some control over who gets to see the content.204 This
implicit authorial control reinforces the broader policy interests in
first publication.205
The concept of “limited” publication has lost some coherence
due to the Internet,206 which facilitates the reproduction and
dissemination of works at virtually zero marginal cost.207 A content
publisher might try to share the work with a limited audience
through technological controls such as paywalls or password
201. Gerhardt, supra note 184 at 171–175.
202. 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2012).
203. Baker v. Libbie, 97 N.E. 109, 112 (Mass. 1912) (holding that an executor may enjoin
the publication of private letters of his testator); see also Grigsby v. Breckinridge, 65
Ky. (2 Bush) 480, 489 (Ky. Ct. App. 1867) (“The only right to be enforced against the holder
[of the letter] is a right to prevent publication . . . .”); Pope v. Curl (1741) 26 Eng. Rep. 608,
608; 2 Atk. 342.
204. Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering the Law of
Confidentiality, 96 GEO. L.J. 123, 140–44 (2007) (describing protection of letters via laws of
“confidential communications”).
205. Gerhardt, supra note 184, at 140–42 (describing problem of limited publication
doctrine and significance of first publication in copyright).
206. Jake Linford, A Second Look at the Right of First Publication, 58 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y
U.S.A. 585 (2010).
207. Schlachter, supra note 24, at 20.
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authentication, but such works often leak from the initial intended
audience to reach larger audiences.208 This makes it increasingly
unrealistic to expect that expression communicated over the
Internet can be restricted to limited audiences without significant
effort. In other words, a limited Internet dissemination in the
ordinary course may be an oxymoron.
Sometimes, limited-dissemination works raise similar authorial
privacy interests as never-disseminated works, such as fomenting
communication, relationships, and intellectual autonomy as a
precursor to valuable public expression. Because of these potential
contributions to the intellectual commons, providing copyright
protection to limited-dissemination works can also advance
copyright’s overall policy goals. This is true when authors use
password controls on digital works (such as emails, text messages,
or web postings) in an attempt to keep the expressive work from
the general public.
Two recent cases demonstrate the implications when copyright
claims for limited Internet disseminations do not advance these
goals.209 Swatch involved the unauthorized dissemination of a
conference call transcript for investors, which a third party
published to expose a competitor’s business dealings.210 Diebold
involved the publication of internal emails discussing flaws in
voting machines.211 In both cases, the plaintiffs articulated privacy
concerns but brought copyright infringement claims. Each court
held that the unauthorized dissemination of the private
communications was not copyright infringement.

208. See Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic Stutzman, The Case for Online Obscurity, 101
CALIF. L. REV. 1, 25–26 (2013) (criticizing but acknowledging a line of cases that finds
unreasonable expectation of privacy for posted content on Internet, even if password
protected, citing United States v. Gines-Perez, 214 F. Supp. 2d 205, 225 (D.P.R. 2002)).
209. See Leval, supra note 140, at 1119 (“Notwithstanding that nearly all writings may
benefit from copyright, its central concern is for the protection of material conceived with a
view to publication, not of private memos and confidential communications that its authors
do not intend to share with the public. The law was not designed to encourage shoppers to
make written shopping lists, executives to keep orderly appointment calendars, or lovers to
write love letters.”).
210. Swatch Grp. v. Bloomberg L.P., 756 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2014) (no copyright
infringement for unauthorized publication of sound recording and transcript of investor
conference call).
211. Online Policy Grp. v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (no
copyright infringement for publication of internal company emails revealing flaw in
voting machines).
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The Swatch outcome reflects that privacy was not a necessary
condition for the investor conference call, which was intended to
communicate important information to a wide group of people.212
In Diebold, arguably the employee-author assumed the email would
remain within the company. While not a classic authorial privacy
interest, the author’s expectation of a limited audience might have
been essential to the email’s creation. Nevertheless, the
countervailing social interests in voting machine flaws—not
dissimilar to the issues raised by whistleblowers—properly
outweigh the privacy considerations.213
As a result, the courts rightly concluded that the disseminations
did not constitute copyright infringement. In fact, the precise injury
in both cases was more like breach of confidence and trust, an
ancient and rarely used tort,214 not copyright infringement.215
Copyright is the wrong claim given its policy goals of production
and dissemination of socially valuable knowledge and information
and the plaintiffs’ aim in both cases for erasure or secrecy of that
information. Information about voting machine flaws and investor
concerns of publicly traded companies are properly of public
interest and were at risk in both of these cases because of copyright
law’s expanding use in privacy contexts. In contrast to the Swatch
and Diebold examples, some limited-dissemination works, such as
nonconsensual pornography, may lack both qualities of intentional
authorship and socially valuable knowledge and information. We
revisit those complexities in Part IV.B.4 below as part of our
discussion of photos and videos.
In sum, limited-dissemination works may retain enough
privacy characteristics that they are the functional equivalent of
never-disseminated works, in which case it is appropriate to
recognize the copyright/privacy overlaps. Otherwise, limited
dissemination sufficiently and properly erodes privacy interests
as protected through copyright. Distorting copyright law to

212. Swatch, 756 F.3d at 92.
213. Diebold, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 1203 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (“It is hard to imagine a subject
the discussion of which could be more in the public interest. If Diebold’s machines in fact do
tabulate voters’ preferences incorrectly, the very legitimacy of elections would be suspect.”).
214. Richards & Solove, supra note 204, at 156–57; see also Ari Ezra Waldman, A Breach
of Trust: Fighting Nonconsensual Pornography, 102 IOWA L. REV. 709, 713 (2017).
215. See Leval, supra note 140, at 1119.
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circumstances
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copyright’s

3. Heirs and “nostalgic remembrances”
We refer to heirs’ control over the deceased’s copyrighted
works as “nostalgic remembrances.” Exercising this control raises
complex and emotional interpersonal dynamics.216 Sometimes, the
heirs seek to maximize the economic returns from the copyright
legacy,217 and their copyright management practices resemble the
practices of other profit-maximizing copyright owners.
Other times, heirs exercise their control to address personal
considerations, such as keeping public audiences from intruding
into the private expressive domain of authors and their families.218
For example, the estates of authors Willa Cather, James Joyce, and
J.D. Salinger used copyright claims to restrict public access to the
deceased’s drafts, letters, journals, and notes, including
information contained therein.219 In privacy terms, the heirs’
decisions hindered intrusion into seclusion of intellectual and
spatial dimensions—the right to keep one’s effects and mind free
from the oversight of others.220
216. See, e.g., Andrew Gilden, IP, R.I.P., 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 639 (2017); Eva E. Subotnik,
Artistic Control After Death, 92 WASH. L. REV. 253 (2017) [hereinafter Subotnik, Artistic
Control]; Eva E. Subotnik, Copyright and the Living Dead: Succession Law and the Postmortem
Term, 29 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 77 (2015).
217. Quinn Norton, The International Fight over Marcel DuChamp’s Chess Set,
ATLANTIC, (Sept. 8, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/09/theinternational-fight-over-marcel-duchamps-chess-set/404248/.
218. See, e.g., Gilden, supra note 4, at 93-98. Professor Gilden describes how copyright
can help manage personal boundaries, which can help promote kinship, community, and
autonomy as well as shape the cultural memory of departed family members and other loved
ones. These concerns are not limited to the deceased, however, so this argument pushes
copyright to morph into a general-purpose tort for redressing a wide range of social ills. We
prefer to keep copyright focused on the problems it was designed to solve, because
expanding copyright more broadly creates several new problems, including the ill effects on
speech discussed throughout this Article.
219. Subotnik, Artistic Control, supra note 216 (discussing cases). During his lifetime,
J.D. Salinger successfully sued a biographer, Ian Hamilton, and his publisher, Random
House, to enjoin a biography that incorporated his unpublished letters. Salinger v. Random
House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that an author’s control over unpublished
letters supersedes third parties’ rights to publish extracts under fair use). However, soon
after this ruling, Congress amended fair use to make sure courts did not overweigh
unpublished status, which may have undermined the precedential authority of the Second
Circuit’s ruling.
220. See U.S. CONST. amends. I, IV; see also Chemerinsky, supra note 143, at 645.
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In other situations, heirs seek to manage the reputation of the
deceased or people associated with the deceased.221 This may
include preventing the publication of works that would sully the
deceased’s reputation as an artist or creator, or works that may
advance ideas or arguments antithetical to the deceased’s views.222
And, like other situations illustrated in this Article, heirs’ privacyand reputation-driven decisions can create tension with standard
copyright doctrines.
The copyright tensions can be exacerbated by the deceased’s
instructions in a will or otherwise, as seen in well-known examples
of authors instructing their estates to destroy all unpublished
drafts, as Kafka famously did,223 or keep unpublished writing and
letters private.224 With respect to never-disseminated works, the
deceased’s desire for control after death can support the intellectual
freedom while they are alive (i.e., providing authors with the
freedom to think and explore without interference from prying
eyes). Knowing that this non-interference will extend post-mortem
enhances the freedom and possibly also the works’ creation. Using
copyright to control the first publication of works, even when also
protecting privacy interests related to publication, makes sense.225
If privacy concerns are so strong, it might be tempting to expect
the authors to destroy their private works while they are still alive,
221. Gordon Bowker, An End to Bad Heir Days: The Posthumous Power of the Literary
Estate, INDEPENDENT, (Jan. 6, 2012, 1:00 AM), https://www.independent.co.uk/artsentertainment/books/features/an-end-to-bad-heir-days-the-posthumous-power-of-theliterary-estate-6285277.html. The copyright disputes regarding the James Joyce writings
(letters and drafts) were about both Joyce’s reputation as a writer and the privacy of the
family members and lovers he wrote about.
222. See Gilden, supra note 216(describing the phenomenon more broadly); Leval, supra
note 140, at 1118 (referring to the “widow censor”); see also Johnathan Band, Can You
Copyright a Dream?, POLITICO MAGAZINE, (Jan. 12, 2015), http://www.politico.com/
magazine/story/2015/01/selma-martin-luther-king-can-you-copyright-a-dream-114187;
Brittany Spanos, Marvin Gaye’s Children: What Our Father Would Say About Lawsuit, ROLLING
STONE, (Mar. 18, 2015 10:15 PM), http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/marvingayes-children-what-our-father-would-say-about-lawsuit-20150318.
223. Subotnik, Artistic Control, supra note 216, at 257, 265–66 (citing JOSEPH SAX,
PLAYING DARTS WITH A REMBRANDT: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RIGHTS IN CULTURAL TREASURES
46, 135–38 (1999) and Nili Cohen, The Betrayed (?) Wills of Kafka and Brod, 27 L. & LITERATURE
1, 13 (2015)).
224. Subotnik, Artistic Control, supra note 216, at 16–17 (citing Willa Cather’s will).
225. When papers are placed in a restricted-access archive, such as James Joyce’s
effects, this becomes analogous to a limited dissemination—and when used for scholarly
purposes should usually be fair use. See Paul K. Saint-Amour et al, James Joyce: Copyright, Fair
Use, and Permissions: Frequently Asked Questions, 44 JAMES JOYCE Q. 753 (2007).
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rather than risk posthumous divulgation. However, this is a bad
idea from an intellectual privacy perspective and inconsistent with
our understanding of how authors actually work and express
themselves. Authors initially write or create works principally for
themselves, not for an audience.226 For many artists and authors,
creating work is synonymous with thinking; it is essential to
processing the world and one’s experiences in it.227 Capturing those
expressions helps authors keep track of their lives and better
understand them. If these materials are destroyed while the author
is still alive, the author loses a lot more than paper. Authors often
analogize the destruction of their works to suicide or death.228
Fortunately, Max Brod (Kafka’s friend who was directed to
destroy his works) did not burn Kafka’s manuscripts, and Willa
Cather’s heirs eventually released her letters. Those documents will
eventually enter the public domain.229 Still, the peace of mind that
Cather and Kafka felt about copyright’s control over their private
effects and intellectual works may have facilitated both living and
writing as well as they did.
These cases of heirs using copyright to exert posthumous
control of never-published works contrast with copyright claims
seeking to control already-published works of the deceased. These
latter cases are weaker from copyright policy perspective despite
raising similar privacy concerns. Two recent examples follow.
First, The Beastie Boys sued the toy company Goldiblox for its
parody of the song Girls in an advertisement for an engineering toy
226. MIHALY CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, CREATIVITY: FLOW AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
DISCOVERY AND INVENTION 107–26 (1996) (describing the fun of creating and the pleasure of
flow that sustains creativity).
227. Id. at 113–15 (describing creators’ goals centered on challenges, building skills and
intrinsic problem solving about the world as they find it); see also SILBEY, EUREKA MYTH, supra
note 3, at 39 (describing an author’s experience of writing as her “filter on the world” and
how she “recycle[s] an experience . . . [to] ma[k]e order out of all this stuff that’s so hard
to navigate”).
228. SILBEY, EUREKA MYTH, supra note 3, at 87–88 (scientist comparing the shuttering of
his project to his child’s death).
229. Subotnik, Artistic Control, supra note 216, at 56 (describing risk that authors might
destroy works rather than rely on untrustworthy heirs or an inconsistent legal system and
arguing that allowing authors to preserve privacy through trusts may be a way to promote
creativity so that when destruction is likely, trusts should be allowed). Also, copyrights last
at least 70 years, while privacy rights usually expire upon death. Publicity rights can endure
beyond the person in some states, like California’s extension for 70 years beyond death (CAL.
CIV. CODE § 3344.1 (West 2012)). In contrast, New York’s publicity rights terminate at death
(N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (Consol. 1995)).
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directed at young girls.230 Deceased Beastie Boy Adam Yauch’s will
specified that his music should not be used for “advertising
purposes,” and the remaining band members sued to preserve
that request.231
Second, Marvin Gaye’s heirs sued Robin Thicke and Pharrell
Williams over the song Blurred Lines. Gaye’s children explained that
“through [dad’s] music . . . we find our compass and our paths
moving forward. We are his children, but we too are his fans and
we hold his music dear.”232 They described their vigilance in terms
of being “caretakers” with “an obligation to . . . preserv[e] the
integrity of the music so that future generations understand its
origins and feel its effect as the artist intended.”233
Heirs may frame their concerns in terms of their perception of
the deceased’s artistic integrity, but copyright law does not
recognize moral rights of non-authors, and it recognizes author’s
moral rights only under very limited circumstances.234 Moreover,
the heirs’ copyright assertions for already widely disseminated
works do not advance interests in private spaces, things, bodies,
existing relationships, or information.235 Instead, the heirs wield
copyright to control how the public ascribes meaning to these
works—a motivation that conflicts with copyright’s fair use
doctrine and principles of the First Amendment.
Heirs also appear motivated to preserve their families’ honor or
“reinforce family ties” with the deceased.236 As Andrew Gilden and
Eva Subotnik have explained, family and friends sometimes seek to
230. Stuart Dredge, GoldieBlox Agreed to Pay $1M to Charity in Beastie Boys
Settlement, GUARDIAN (May 13, 2014, 4:17 AM), https://www.theguardian.
com/technology/2014/may/13/goldieblox-beastie-boys-girls-settlement.
231. Id.; see also Subotnik, Artistic Control, supra note 216, at 269.
232. Spanos, supra note 222.
233. Id.
234. Largely because of its interference with the First Amendment, U.S. copyright law
only recognizes artistic integrity in limited circumstances involving works of visual art. 17
U.S.C. § 106A (2012). See supra note 19 and accompanying discussion.
235. Gilden, supra note 216. Professor Gilden argues that copyright assertions by heirs
(including for published works) may advance interests in bodily autonomy and personal
relationships. He describes these interests as “boundary-management.” We see the
copyright/privacy interface as largely rooted in constitutional notions of privacy. Professor
Gilden’s article addresses much broader conceptions beyond privacy, including social
relations and what he calls “kinship” and “community.”
236. Eva Subotnik, Free as the Heir?: Copyright Successors and Stewardship (June 12,
2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); Subotnik, Artistic Control, supra note
216, at 276 (describing “reinforc[ing] family ties” as a basis for “dead-hand control”).
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preserve memories of the deceased as they wished them to be,
without modification by other people who remain alive.237
Although privacy law protects family relationships,238 those
privacy interests usually terminate at death.239 Heirs’ claims are
posthumous by definition.
Heirs’ efforts to control memories of authors are especially
problematic when inhibiting the ability of other authors to build
upon the cultural foundation of already-disseminated works. For
example, Robin Thicke listened to and learned from past musicians,
including Marvin Gaye, to make his own music. This is the way
copyright law envisioned authors learning from and building upon
each other’s works. Similarly, Goldiblox used the Beastie Boys’
song to make the important point that once derogatory and
demeaning connotations—”Girls” objectified because of gender—
can be transformed into empowering messages. By allowing this
accretive creative process, copyright law enables authors to extend
earlier works and create new understandings of them.
In sum, when heirs claim copyright to protect the deceased’s
privacy or reputational interests, they affect other people’s lives
and expressions. Suppressing the already-published work of the
deceased author, even to protect a private relationship with the
heir, erases memories for other people as well.240 The decision to
create memory holes in other people’s lives should not reside solely
in the hands of copyright heirs.241 Furthermore, excising the work
237. Andrew Gilden, supra note 216, at 93-98; Andrew Gilden, Sinatra’s Mug and PostMortem Publicity Rights, PRAWFSBLAWG, (Dec. 11, 2015), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/
prawfsblawg/2015/12/sinatras-mug-and-postmortem-publicity-rights.html;
Subotnik,
Artistic Control, supra note 216, at 276.
238. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2016); e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558 (2003).
239. RAY D. MADOFF, IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW: THE RISING POWER OF THE AMERICAN
DEAD 125–26 (2010).
240. Professor Abraham Drassinower frames this discussion in terms of speech, not
memories. ABRAHAM DRASSINOWER, WHAT’S WRONG WITH COPYING? (2015). Drassinower
describes copyright as a “bilateral” right of both authors and speakers; thus, if copyright tilts
too much towards authors’ interests, it does not sufficiently protect the rights of other
speakers, including subsequent authors. For this reason, Drassinower believes that giving a
copyright owner the right to enjoin other people’s speech conflicts with the fundamental
structure of copyright law.
241. Heirs sometimes feel constrained to manage the copyrights of the deceased in
ways they may otherwise wish to avoid by force of inheritable transfer and to pay taxes. Our
critique in this paper is with the management choices, not with the problem of inheritable
copyright per se. But one way to alleviate the burden of descendible copyright is for it to
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from public discourse distorts and depletes the information and
cultural understandings about these works and relationships
already in circulation. Privacy law does not permit such control
over public work in light of the First Amendment and after one’s
death. Copyright law should not permit such claims either.
4. Photos and videos
Visual media (e.g., photos and videos) potentially create extra
conflicts between privacy and copyright.242 Photos and videos
typically convey more comprehensive information compared to
word descriptions. Moreover, a controversial or revealing photo or
video circulates more widely and rapidly on the Internet than
writing about the same person or event.243 In addition, the social
meaning of exposed photos or videos that were intended to remain
private, as is the case of many sexual images, is vastly different
from the array of social meanings of already-published
written works by authors.244 Thus, people depicted in photos
or videos may feel that their dissemination is especially
troublesome. Perhaps for this reason, the law (including privacy
and copyright) tends to give photos and videos extra legal
protections compared to other media.245
expire at the death of the author—as privacy claims do—or sooner. We thank Andrew Gilden
for pushing us on this point.
242. This argument might also apply to audio recordings, which are also subject to
extra privacy protections such as laws against nonconsensual recordings. For simplicity, we
focus on visual media.
243. See, e.g., Rachel Gillett, Why We’re More Likely to Remember Content with Images and
Video, FAST COMPANY, (Sept. 18, 2014), https://www.fastcompany.com/3035856/whywere-more-likely-to-remember-content-with-images-and-video-infogr (“[T]weets with
images are 94% more likely to be retweeted than tweets without.”); Noah Kagan, Why
Content Goes Viral: What Analyzing 100 Million Articles Taught Us, HUFFPOST, (June 13, 2014,
6:51
PM),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/why-content-goes-viral-wh_b_5492767
(“[T]wice as many people, on average[,] share posts with at least one image in the post . . . .”);
see also An Xiao Mina, That Merkel Photo is More Like a Meme than a Renaissance Painting,
ATLANTIC, (June 11, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/06/
that-merkel-photo-is-more-like-a-meme-than-a-renaissance-painting/562505/.
244. Jessica Silbey, Evidence Verité and the Law of Film, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1257, 1260
(2010) (iconic public images generate multiple social and legal meanings beyond their initial
contextual existence and origins); Jessica Silbey, Images in/of Law, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 171,
172–75 (2012–13) (describing how images are intuitively understood and yet collectively
inscrutable, posing unique problems for resolving legal conflicts that demand common and
shared language).
245. Jessica M. Silbey, Judges as Film Critics: New Approaches to Filmic Evidence, 37 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 493 (2004) (critiquing courts’ treatment of film and photography as
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Nonconsensual pornography—sometimes imprecisely called
“revenge porn”—highlights some of the difficult doctrinal tensions
between privacy and copyright protection for photos and videos.
Nonconsensual pornography is “the distribution of private,
sexually explicit images of individuals without their consent.”246
Plaintiffs in nonconsensual pornography cases often do not own
the copyright to the photo or video depicting them, so they have
incentives to adopt some of the copyright acquisition techniques
discussed in Part III.247 For all of the reasons discussed there,
copyright may be ill-designed to redress the depicted person’s
paramount privacy interests.
So the question is: What are the respective scopes of privacy and
copyright protection for photos and videos, and when should one
doctrine fill any “gaps” in the other? Two cases (in addition to the
cases discussed in Part III) provide some additional insights
into the opportunities and pitfalls of copyright/privacy overlaps in
this category.
a. Hill v. Public Advocate. This case involved a conservative antimarriage equality advocacy organization that featured an
engagement photo of a gay couple in an anti-gay political
campaign.248 The professional photographer and the married
couple sued Public Advocate for copyright infringement and
misappropriation of likeness. The court dismissed the
misappropriation claim on First Amendment grounds because
Public Advocate’s use of the photo “reasonably relate[d] to . . . a
matter that is newsworthy or of legitimate public concern.”249
However, the photographer’s copyright claim survived. The
court concluded that the photo’s reuse may be infringing and not
fair, despite its arguably transformative nature. In other words, the
photograph’s newsworthiness extinguished the privacy claim but
without need of interpretation in general); see also Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words:
The Images of Copyright, 125 HARV. L. REV. 683, 686–87 (2012) (critiquing courts’ treatment of
images in copyright law as either transparent or opaque, in each case denying the role and
necessity of interpretation).
246. Definitions,
CYBER C.R. INITIATIVE,
https://www.cybercivilrights.org/
definitions/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2019).
247. Amanda Levendowski, Using Copyright to Combat Revenge Porn, 3 N.Y.U. J. INTELL.
PROP. & ENT. L. 422, 439–40 (2014) (discussing incidents of revenge porn and potential reach
of copyright law to effect takedowns and damages).
248. Hill v. Public Advocate, 35 F. Supp. 3d 1347, 1351–52 (D. Colo. 2014).
249. Id. at 1355.
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not the copyright claim. Public Advocate settled the copyright
infringement claim by paying the photographer $2501.250
b. Balsley v. LFP. The plaintiff in this case, a television
newscaster, participated in a wet T-shirt contest in a public bar.251
Without her consent, a photographer took a photo of her contest
participation and published it in Lenshead.com, an adult website.
After the photograph’s dissemination, the plaintiff lost her job. To
limit further dissemination, the plaintiff bought the photo’s
copyright. Subsequently, Hustler, a pornographic magazine,
republished the photo, and the plaintiff sued Hustler for copyright
infringement, privacy violations, and publicity rights violations.
However, only the copyright infringement claim reached the jury.
Finding no fair use, the jury awarded plaintiff $135,000 plus fees,
and the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
Balsley and Hill resemble several other cases discussed in this
Article (Monge, Garcia, and Katz). Unlike the claims in Garcia and
Katz, the copyright claims in Balsley and Hill252 succeeded.253 Why?
The circumstances concerning the photographs are materially
different between the cases. For example, in both Balsley and Hill
(unlike in Monge), the photo’s initial dissemination was by, or
authorized by, the author. Balsley closely resembles Katz in that a
public figure (or quasi-public figure) plaintiff acquired a photo’s
copyright in order to suppress it. Unlike the plaintiff in
Katz, however, the Balsley and Hill plaintiffs prevailed over a fair
use defense.

250. David Walker, Photographer Wins $2,501 for Infringement in Anti-Gay Attack Ad Case,
PDNPULSE (June 23, 2014), https://pdnpulse.pdnonline.com/2014/06/photographer-wins2501-infringement-anti-gay-attack-ad-case.html.
251. Balsley v. LFP, Inc., 691 F.3d 747, 747 (6th Cir. 2012).
252. We do not analyze the publicity rights of both plaintiffs because they are beyond
the scope of this article. See ROTHMAN, supra note 117.
253. Two other unsuccessful copyright enforcements involving photographs or videos
include: (1) Dhillon v. Does 1–10, No. C 13-01465 SI, 2014 WL 722592 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2014)
(the defendant reused the plaintiff’s headshot fairly to criticize plaintiff’s political views);
and (2) Caner v. Autry, 16 F. Supp. 3d 689 (W.D. Va. 2014) (a university president sought to
suppress further dissemination of videos of which he was not the author because they
supported others’ claims that he lied).
These cases implicate false light more than intrusion upon seclusion or other privacy
doctrines because the depictions were already widely disseminated. Nevertheless, they
failed on both copyright and privacy grounds because the depictions were not false, and they
had substantial newsworthiness and transformative value.

984

002.GOLDMAN_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

929

7/17/20 12:37 PM

Copyright’s Memory Hole

One hypothesis is that the Balsley and Hill plaintiffs had
stronger arguments to undermine fair use. The fair use doctrine
excuses some secondary copyright uses by using a multifactor test
with the ultimate purpose of enabling more expression. When
considering whether a secondary use is fair, courts evaluate the
purpose and character of the secondary use, including whether the
secondary use transformed, commented on, or critiqued the
original work in any way. Other factors include the nature of the
original work, the amount and substantiality of the original work
taken by the secondary use, and the secondary use’s effect on the
market for the original work or the value of the original work.254
In Balsley, the photo republication was not transformative
because the Lenshead and Hustler publications served the same
purposes—voyeuristic entertainment. Conversely, in Katz and Hill,
the republication criticized the photo’s subject, a classic fair use.
Also, even though the plaintiff in Balsley didn’t have any interest in
commercializing the photo, the jury found that the republications
reduced her ability to market it (which would be relevant to fair
use’s “market harm” factor).255 That conclusion seems artificial
because the plaintiff wanted to keep the photo out of the
marketplace entirely in order to erase all public knowledge of it
(which was not the case in Hill).256 This is qualitatively different
than a copyright owner “windowing” content257 to maximize
economic returns. A suppression motivation is precisely what
copyright law should not support.
Yet, it is easy to imagine the jury sympathized with the plaintiff
in Balsley. Balsley never had the choice of whether to publish the
photo, and its dissemination damaged her career. The photo’s
presentation was objectionable; Hustler included the photo in its
“Hot News Babe” contest and described the plaintiff as a “tasty
talking head.”258 Also, like cases involving nonconsensual
pornography, Balsley involves “grave emotional and dignitary
254. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
255. Id. § 107(4) (“[T]he effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.”).
256. For a critique of this weak market harm analysis, see Gilden, supra note 197; see also
Balganesh, supra note 73 (discussing the weak market harm analysis in Monge as well).
257. See supra text accompanying notes 2 and 3.
258. Balsley v. LFP, Inc., 691 F.3d 747, 756 (6th Cir. 2012). Similarly, had Hill reached a
jury, the jury might have been sympathetic to the engaged couple and the fact that a political
organization targeted their choice to be married.
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harms,” increased “risks of physical assault,” and “chill[ed] selfexpression and ruin[ed] lives.”259 If the case did not involve
sexualized images and the media’s exploitation and objectification
of women, the plaintiff’s opportunistic copyright interest might
have been less compelling to the jury.260
The jury also might have sympathized with the plaintiff in
Balsley because the wet T-shirt contest took place before a limited
audience. In contrast, the Garcia actress expected to be in a widely
disseminated film.261 However, this does not explain the proplaintiff result in Hill, which involved photos taken in the open that
were published first, with plaintiffs’ permission, on a public
website. The plaintiffs in Hill or Monge might have secured their
photos more carefully if they had feared their widespread
dissemination and reuse, but they still would have created the
photos. Authorial privacy interests were therefore less at play in
both Hill and Monge.
Balsley also participated in the wet T-shirt contest behind a
business establishment’s doors, which ordinarily means that her
actions would not be viewable to the world. However, the business
establishment—a bar—arguably was still a public space. Both
privacy law and the First Amendment allow reporting and
depiction of events in public spaces. Copyright law should not
usurp this public reporting function. The plaintiff in Balsley might
have preferred not to have her participation in a wet T-shirt contest
recorded, but her participation was squarely in the public sphere.
Copyright law should not be used to erase content representing
consensual public behavior at the expense of promoting other
authors’ speech and public debate (the speech of bystander
photographers, subsequent speakers about the photographs, and
the media).262

259. Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 345 (2014).
260. But see Rebecca Tushnet, My Fair Ladies: Sex, Gender, and Fair Use in Copyright, 15
AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 273, 273–304 (2007).
261. Debate exists as to what kind of film Garcia consented to, but she did at least
consent to her performance being published as a film. As the appellate decision indicates,
she might have a fraud claim, but not a copyright claim.
262. See, e.g., Rebecca Tushnet, Fair Use’s Unfinished Business, 15 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL.
PROP. 399, 405 (2016) (critiquing copyright claims that assert privacy interests when they are
not interests of authorship).
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The pseudopublic location of Balsley’s activities weakens her
privacy interests, making it especially problematic to distort
copyright doctrine in an attempt to accommodate those privacy
interests. But changing the focus of the privacy interests—say,
activity in private spaces such as nonconsensual pornography—
should not strengthen the copyright interests of works that have
been disseminated, even in a limited fashion. Authored works that
have never been disseminated, however, may properly be the
subject of a copyright claim as described above, aligning the spatial
privacy and bodily privacy with the never-disseminated aspect of
the copyrighted work. Nonconsensual pornography does not fall
into that category, however, when it is not authored by the victim
(when it is authored and owned by the defendant who
disseminates without permission), or when it is authored and
disseminated by the subject, albeit to a limited audience.263 The
sympathetic nature of nonconsensual pornography claims has led
to the persistent misuse of copyright in privacy-invasive settings by
both courts and complainants, as previously discussed.264
However, it has also led to more focused law reform efforts to
protect victims outside the scope of copyright law.265
In sum, although photos and videos can be especially privacy
invasive, they should not be treated differently from other
copyrighted works. Moreover, the qualities of photographs and
videos as particularly attention-grabbing and capable of conveying
comprehensive information reinforce the value of separating
privacy and copyright interests. Otherwise, these very qualities of
photographs and videos risk prioritizing privacy interests in every
copyright case and paying inadequate attention to the other social
values encoded into copyright law.

263. A full analysis of nonconsensual pornography is beyond the scope of this article.
A few sources on the topic: Ann Bartow, Copyright Law and Pornography, 91 OR. L. REV. 1
(2012); Eric Goldman & Angie Jin, Judicial Resolution of Nonconsensual Pornography
Dissemination Cases, 14 I/S: J.L. AND POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 283 (2018); Levendowski, supra
note 247.
264. See discussion of Monge and Garcia supra notes 131–146 and 207.
265. See Advocacy, CYBER CIVIL RIGHTS INITIATIVE, https://www.cybercivil
rights.org/advocacy/ (last visited Sept. 14, 2019).

987

002.GOLDMAN_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

7/17/20 12:37 PM

2019

5. Why valorize copyright?
Stepping back, the privacy injuries in most of the cases
discussed in this Article are cogent and significant, namely bodily
appropriation, intrusion into seclusion, and misappropriation of
identity. Yet, these privacy claims fail. In contrast, the copyright
claims are doctrinally slippery and misguided, yet sometimes they
prevail. Why?
Perhaps the success of the copyright claims and the failure of
privacy claims is part of a broader phenomenon of the
“propertization” of IP,266 where legal rights in intangible assets are
considered to be “property” rights supported by strong proproperty social norms that attach to ownership and control of land
and personal property. If so, the law is biased in favor of property,
and because privacy is not property, privacy claims fail.267
An alternative hypothesis is that privacy and free speech are
both important constitutional rights, but when they conflict, free
speech prevails. In contrast, copyright is sometimes characterized
as a private right that does not conflict with other important
fundamental rights, such as the right of privacy and free speech.268
These characterizations of copyright and privacy would naturally
lead to copyright succeeding in cases where privacy claims must
yield to the First Amendment.
However, these characterizations are flawed. Copyright law is
not just a private right. It aims to promote progress of science to
benefit the public. As a power granted to Congress in pursuit of the
public interest, permissible copyright limitations on free speech
require consideration of public benefits as well as private interests.
We cannot simply focus on the private benefit from suppressing
photos and videos without considering the value of the secondary
speech they promote. Otherwise, copyright law becomes a tool for
266. For an overview of the literature and a critique of its inevitable strengthening of
IP rights, see Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property Paradigm, 54
DUKE L.J. 1 (2004).
267. We do not condone this hierarchy of property over privacy or, for that matter, the
characterization of copyright as property. See DRASSINOWER, supra note 240, at 22 (arguing
against treating copyright as a property instead of a relationship between a person, his or
her speech, and the audience).
268. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 190, 219 (2003) (describing copyright as a
“marketable right to the use of one’s expression” and that “[the First] Amendment and the
Copyright Clause were adopted close in time . . . indicat[ing] the Framers’ view that
copyright’s limited monopolies are compatible with free speech principles”).

988

002.GOLDMAN_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

929

7/17/20 12:37 PM

Copyright’s Memory Hole

scrubbing unwanted content, an Orwellian device that stifles
diverse expressions and critical conversations.269 If privacy must be
protected—and there is much to deride in the privacy-invasive
behavior of defendants described above—privacy law (or some
other tort law) should protect it.270 Drafting copyright to perform
that job derogates copyright’s service to the public interest in the
progress of science.
6. Recap
Copyright and privacy can partner to spur creation and
eventual dissemination of socially valuable works. The most
significant and effective partnership is that of protecting neverdisseminated works during the author’s lifetime,271 where
unapproved dissemination, or even the threat of such
dissemination, can undermine the author’s intellectual freedom
and thus authorial productivity. In most instances, however, using
copyright to protect privacy produces untenable conflicts with
fundamental rights, such as the right of free speech and the public
interest in science and self-government that free speech promotes.
Copyright law famously does not distinguish between high value
and low value works (however that may be defined), leaving
discrimination of treatment based on aesthetic or moral features of
the work to the audience.272 Were privacy interests to become the
proxy for aesthetic or content discrimination, enabling plaintiffs to
claim stronger copyright because the subject of the work is
particularly privacy invasive or allegedly not socially valuable,
269. Using copyright to suppress factually misleading or inaccurate content to prevent
distortion through deletion is equally problematic. First, these claims are better suited for
defamation actions, with their balanced proof requirements and remedies. Second, First
Amendment doctrine, which copyright incorporates, defaults to more speech (a
“marketplace”), not less, to promote optimal quantity and quality of expression. See supra
text accompanying note 14 (discussing the counterspeech doctrine).
270. Leval, supra note 140; Tushnet, supra note 4, at 2349 (rejecting the use of copyright
to protect subjects of intimate photographs from their unwanted dissemination and
suggesting “the case for a new intellectual property (or more properly, privacy or dignity)
right for people depicted in intimate photos and videos could most persuasively be made on
its own merits”); see Jeffrey L. Harrison, Privacy, Copyright, and Letters, 3 ELON L. REV.
161 (2012).
271. Samuelson, supra note 141, at 198 (arguing that Warren and Brandeis “recognized
that copyright’s utility in protecting privacy interests was salient only when works
were unpublished”).
272. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
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copyright law’s promise of promoting diversity of expression and
democratic engagement would falter. This outcome is worth
resisting, and the next Part will explain how to do so. However, we
do not intend to derogate the availability of recourse pursuant to
privacy and reputation laws in situations where copyright recourse
is improper or unavailable.
V. FIGHTING COPYRIGHT’S MEMORY HOLE:
SOME REFORM PROPOSALS
This Article has explained how copyright’s deployment can
erase content in order to protect privacy and reputation. It has also
identified some limited circumstances in which copyright may be
an appropriate tool for protecting privacy interests, especially
when the work has never been disseminated and is not yet part of
a public “memory.” In most or all other circumstances, deploying
copyright to manage privacy and reputation abuses the purpose of
copyright law and its foundation in the public interest and should
not be countenanced. This Part considers doctrinal steps to inhibit
the misapplication of copyright law for privacy purposes.
A. Enhancing the Fair Use Doctrine
The fair use doctrine is a multifactor test rendering the
unauthorized use of a copyrighted work beyond copyright law’s
proscription.273 It considers: the purpose and character of the
secondary use (including whether the secondary use
“transformed” the work), the nature of the original work, the
amount and substantiality of the original work taken by the
secondary use, and the secondary use’s effect on the market for the
original work or value of the original work.274
Fair use already thwarts abusive enforcement actions, as Katz
has demonstrated. The fair use doctrine can be further enhanced to
inhibit and perhaps prevent other similar actions, especially using
fair use’s “nature of the work” prong.275
Typically, as part of this second factor, courts consider whether
the work is more fact-like or fiction-like. In the cases concerning
photography, for example, courts struggle with the level of
273. Lydia Pallas Loren, Fair Use: An Affirmative Defense?, 90 WASH. L. REV. 685 (2015).
274. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
275. Id.
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creativity and factual nature of the work. Where the use of the
photo provides information that text could not adequately convey,
such as the details of the WorldStarHipHop fight, fair use should
favor disclosure. On the other hand, where text would
communicate just as effectively as photos or videos, such as
communicating the fact that the marriage took place in Monge, the
second fair use factor might weigh against disclosure. Even then,
where the depicted person might improperly dispute the facts,
showing the photo or video helps discern the truth, and fair use
should support that truth-validating function.276
Courts also consider the published or unpublished nature of the
work as part of the second fair use factor. When a work was not
published but only disseminated privately, or first published
without authority, protecting the work from further disclosure
should be counted against fair use to protect the author’s or
owner’s privacy interest in seclusion and the intellectual privacy
coincident with authorship.277 This might fit the facts of Balsley and
Monge, for example. Conversely, when a work was initially
published legitimately, as in Hill and Katz, and the copyright claim
is more akin to false light rather than first publication or intrusion
into seclusion, the extant publication of the work should weigh
towards fair use.
The second fair use factor should also consider how and when
copyright acquisition occurs. Post-publication acquisition by the
person depicted in the work for the purpose of suppression should
weigh towards disclosure.278 This would include works “about the
owner” (as opposed to “by the owner”), such as headshots,

276. See Jessica Silbey, Cross-Examining Film, 8 U. MD. L.J. RACE RELIGION GENDER &
CLASS 17, 45–46 (2008) (prescribing analytical uses of film and photographic evidence to
maximize its truth-validating function and minimize its truth-distorting capability).
277. For further discussion of a proposed relationship between fair use and
unpublished works, see Kate O’Neill, Against Dicta: A Legal Method for Rescuing Fair Use from
the Right of First Publication, 89 CAL. L. REV. 369 (2001).
278. Rosemont Enter., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 311 (2d Cir. 1966) (“It
would be contrary to the public interest to permit any man to buy up the copyright to
anything written about himself and to use his copyright ownership to restrain others from
publishing biographical material concerning him.”); Lee, supra note 141, at 386 (“In these
cases brought by non-authors, the claim for protecting the author’s reputation or privacy
over the work as a part of copyright law is diminished, if not destroyed . . . [False] author’s
privacy and reputation are personal rights; to the extent copyright law protects them at all,
the standing to assert such personal rights should be limited to authors.”).
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business reviews, and videos taken of public activities.279 This
implicitly privileges authors over other copyright owners,280 but
such privileging is not unprecedented in copyright law. For
example, the termination of transfer right is available only to a
work’s author and heirs and not to assignees.281
These suggestions indicate that the second fair use factor—
typically given little love in fair use analyses—has a much more
significant role to play when copyright claims implicate privacy
concerns. As a secondary benefit, this would take some pressure off
the first and fourth factor, both of which confound courts when
market injury or transformation is contestable. As illustrated in
Katz, courts sometimes apply the “market effect” factor to
acknowledge that the erasure attempt is illegitimate. However, in
other cases (such as Balsley and Monge), courts analyze the fourth
factor in ways that tautologically favor plaintiffs instead.282
Fair use can be a costly defense to litigate. Courts are reluctant
to grant fair use defenses on motions to dismiss,283 so a fair use
defense usually would entail the costs of discovery and preparing
summary judgment motions—efforts that can easily consume
hundreds of thousands or even millions of dollars.284 The
substantial time and expense needed for fair use defenses act as a
deterrent to litigating them, even if the court might subsequently
award attorneys’ fees. Therefore, configuring fair use doctrines to
efficiently sort legitimate copyright claims from those motivated
primarily by privacy concerns would be a good step, but the
recourse still may not be cost effective.
279. Some works, like selfies, are both “by” and “about” the owner. The “by the owner”
part should be given priority in those cases.
280. See Balganesh, supra note 73 (proposing to limit the ability to bring “censorial
copyright” claims to authors).
281. 17 U.S.C. § 203 (2012).
282. Balsley v. LFP, Inc., 691 F.3d 747, 761 (6th Cir. 2012) (“We agree with Plaintiffs that
their current desire or ability to avail themselves of the market for the Bosley photograph is
immaterial to the issue outlined by the statute, namely, whether there is potential for an
adverse effect on the market for the photograph should the challenged use become
widespread.”). See Balganesh, supra note 73, at 55 (suggesting that the fourth fair use factor
should “reced[e] in importance” when privacy interests are claimed through copyright).
283. WILLIAM F. PATRY, 4 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 10:159 (2019); Tehranian, supra note
51, at 267–68.
284. AIPLA, 2017 REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY I-189 (2017), (the mean cost for
copyright litigation inclusive of discovery, motions, and claim construction is $125,000; that
goes up to $278,000 when including pre-trial, trial, post-trial, and appeal costs).
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Furthermore, fair use is a multifactor and equitable test, and
appellate circuits often develop their own idiosyncratic
jurisprudence. Thus, even if courts started to adapt fair use
principles to recognize privacy considerations (positively or
negatively), it could take decades before those principles became
predictable and recognized nationally. Congress could accelerate
that process by amending the fair use statute, like it did to avoid
overprivileging unpublished works285 after the Supreme Court’s
decision in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc.286 However, Congress has
only made that one substantive statutory amendment to fair use in
forty years. Courts cannot expect Congress to redress this issue.
B. Attorneys’ Fees
Section 505 of the Copyright Act authorizes courts to award
attorneys’ fees to prevailing parties at their discretion.287 In
Kirtsaeng, the Supreme Court reinforced that fees can be awarded
to the prevailing party “even when the losing party advanced a
reasonable claim or defense.”288 Therefore, courts have the power
to award attorneys’ fees to defendants in cases seeking illegitimate
copyright suppression.
Such fee awards have two salutary benefits: they compensate
the defendant for defending the content against illegitimate erasure
in violation of public discourse and free speech principles, and they
deter future plaintiffs from bringing copyright claims to suppress
speech. Courts have already recognized the need to award
attorneys’ fees in some memory hole cases,289 and the Kirtsaeng case
should encourage courts to make such awards even more routine.
C. Anti-SLAPP Law
This Article has highlighted numerous examples of copyright
lawsuits that are motivated by the desire to suppress already
285. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). (“The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a
finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.”).
286. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
287. 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2012).
288. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 136 S.Ct. 1979, 1983 (2016).
289. E.g., Katz v. Chevaldina, 127 F. Supp. 3d 1285 (S.D. Fla. 2015); City of Inglewood
v. Teixeira, No. CV-15-01815-MWF (MRWx), 2015 WL 6146269 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2015)
Righthaven LLC v. DiBiase, No. 2:10-CV-01343-RLH, 2011 WL 5101938 (D. Nev. Oct.
26, 2011).
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published and socially beneficial speech—material that, in many
cases, helps educate audiences about matters already circulating
and in the public interest. As described in Part II, anti-SLAPP laws
do two things: (1) they expedite dismissal of unmeritorious
lawsuits by putting the burden on the plaintiff to establish their
case in the complaint,290 and (2) they provide attorneys’ fee shifting
for defendant-victims.291 Many privacy lawsuits framed as
copyright cases are SLAPPs292 and should be treated as such.
Unfortunately, to our knowledge, no copyright enforcement
action has been deemed a SLAPP.293 This reflects several factors,
including the presence of anti-SLAPP laws only in state civil
procedure law, not federal, and the general inapplicability of state
procedural laws to federal substantive law claims. To remediate
this, Congress should enact a federal anti-SLAPP law and have it
apply to copyright claims that meet the statutory standards of
suppressing socially beneficial speech.294
Applying anti-SLAPP protection to copyright cases that are
designed to advance privacy interests at the expense of socially
beneficial speech would have several benefits, including: (1)
accelerating dismissal of the case, which relieves defendants from
time, money and harassment involved in fighting unmeritorious
lawsuits; (2) narrowing the scope of discovery only to the merits of
the anti-SLAPP motion, which curbs invasive and harassing
discovery requests; (3) implicitly shifting the fair use burden to
plaintiffs, who would have to establish the tenability of their case

290. Instead of filing a motion to dismiss or a state-law equivalent (such as a demurrer),
a SLAPP defendant typically files a “motion to strike.”
291. Most state anti-SLAPP laws make such fee shifts mandatory. State Anti-SLAPP Law
Scorecard, PUB. PARTICIPATION PROJECT, https://anti-slapp.org/your-states-free-speechprotection/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2019). Others leave it to the judge’s discretion. At least one
state, Washington, imposes a mandatory penalty in addition to the fee shift. WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 4.24.525(6)(a)(ii) (West 2016).
292. Other examples can be found in Tehranian, supra note 51.
293. In the one case we know of, Johnson v. Saunders, No. A104475, 2004 WL 1874671
(Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 23, 2004), a state court granted an anti-SLAPP motion to strike in response
to a woman’s allegation that she had “copyrighted her name.” Her copyright claim was
defective on several key grounds, including the fact that state courts do not have jurisdiction
over federal copyright cases. Apparently, the Court interpreted the plaintiff’s name-related
claim as a trademark claim, despite its labeling as a copyright claim.
294. See Tehranian, supra note 51, at 283–86.
Disclosure note: Professor Goldman is a member of the board of directors of the Public
Participation Project, a non-profit organization advocating for a federal anti-SLAPP law.
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in the complaint, including why obvious fair use defenses would
not succeed; and (4) making fee-shifting mandatory, which
provides defendants with more confidence in financial
reimbursement than the copyright law’s discretionary fee shift that
Section 505 provides. This may encourage more defendants to fight
abusive copyright SLAPPs rather than acquiesce to plaintiffs’
demands. It would also discourage copyright owners from
initiating unmeritorious lawsuits as they know that they would
have an increased risk of paying the defense costs.295
Enacting a federal anti-SLAPP law is a good idea.296 Providing
enhanced protection for copyright defendants who are targeted for
disseminating socially beneficial speech provides another
compelling justification.
D. Duration
In numerous areas of privacy law, including many tort and
constitutional claims, plaintiffs must be alive to have a right of
action. This is justifiable because the fundamental value of privacy
runs with the person. Why should copyright be any different when
it is being used to assert similar kinds of claims? Instead, when
copyright is asserted to protect privacy interests—to suppress
private expression rather than to selectively or eventually
disseminate it—the copyright duration should parallel that
of privacy.
When the privacy interest is asserted through or embedded in
the copyrighted work, heirs to the copyright should not have
standing to assert it, and neither should subjects. Moreover, when
privacy is asserted through copyright, and the author voluntarily
published the copyrighted work (despite the subject’s possible
contrary interests), the claim of privacy by the author or subject
(whether brought as a copyright claim or not) should be waived or
limited to actual damages as it would in a privacy dispute.
295. A related approach would be to strengthen 17 U.S.C. § 512(f) (2012), which creates
a cause of action for sending spurious copyright takedown notices. If § 512(f) were stronger,
it would discourage copyright owners from seeking removals not grounded in legitimate
copyright interests.
296. Eric Goldman, 59 Legal Scholars Sign Letter Supporting SPEAK FREE Act to Create
Federal Anti-SLAPP Law, FORBES (Sept. 16, 2015, 2:23 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
ericgoldman/%202015/09/16/59-legal-scholars-sign-letter-supporting-speak-free-act-tocreate-federal-anti-slapp-law/.
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CONCLUSION
We do not seek to disturb the fundamental quid pro quo
animating copyright law: that by giving some exclusive rights to
copyright owners, society will benefit from the resulting works that
are produced by that benefit. However, the quid pro quo function
is not linear. Dialing up the protection for copyright benefits society
to a point. After that point, overprotection for copyright law
becomes a net detriment to society by excessively interfering with
social discourse. This Article has explored one of those situations
where expansive applications of copyright exclusivity leads to
memory holes that are counterproductive to copyright’s purpose.
Unquestionably, the rise of the Internet has exposed some
doctrinal weaknesses in privacy law. Despite the legitimate and
sometimes profound harms experienced by some privacy victims,
copyright law should not be manipulated to fix privacy law’s
problems.297 Instead, copyright law should remain focused on the
purposes it is designed to serve. If those purposes coincidentally
counsel in favor of redressing privacy violations—as they may with
the unauthorized publication of never-disseminated works and
limited other cases—then copyright law is the right tool. In all other
cases, it is not the right tool; and attempts to stretch copyright law
into a general-purpose privacy law pose a grave threat to free and
diverse social discourse, and ultimately to our society.298

297. McKeown, supra note 5, at 16 (“[C]opyright cannot be everything to
everybody . . . No matter how noble and important the values of privacy and protection of
reputation, copyright is not the direct vehicle for their vindication.”).
298. Id. at 8 (“[A] weak copyright claim cannot hijack the First Amendment.”).
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